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INTRODUCTION
“Even in the most intense policy discussions, lawyers are
not potted plants.”1
arold Hongju Koh, former Legal Advisor of the
United States Department of State and a professor
at Yale Law School, wrote the above-cited phrase in the context
of Syria. In the wake of a violent and ongoing civil war in this
volatile nation, including the use of chemical weapons by Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad against his own civilian population,
Koh has argued that nations like the United States should use
force in Syria under the paradigm of humanitarian interven-
tion.2 President Obama has made similar arguments, and sev-
eral nations have considered and contemplated staging a multi-
lateral, United States-led humanitarian intervention in Syria.3
The discussion over a potential use of military force in Syria has
dwindled in light of a recently passed Security Council resolu-
tion, which has created a United Nations-led chemical weapons
inspection and destruction regime.4 President Assad has thus
far agreed to comply with the terms of this regime.5 However,
1 Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part
III—A Reply), JUST SECURITY (Oct. 10, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://justsecu-
rity.org/1863/syria-law-humanitarian-intervention-part-iii-reply [hereinafter
Koh, Part III].
2 See infra Part V.
3 See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
4 Resolution 2118 requires that Syria eliminate its chemical stockpile and al-
low complete access for both the United Nations and the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons chemical weapons inspectors. If Syria does
not comply with either demand, the Security Council would need to adopt a
second resolution regarding imposition of military or other actions against
Syria under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. S.C. Res. 2118, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/2118 (Sept. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Resolution 2118].
5 Colum Lynch, U.N. Warning: Chemical Inspectors Face New Risks in Syria,
FOREIGN POLICY (Dec. 3, 2013, 2:31 PM), http://thecable.foreignpol-
icy.com/posts/2013/12/03/un_warning_chemical_inspec-
H
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should Assad disregard the inspection regime and defy the in-
ternational community, the issue of humanitarian intervention
will once again become center-stage.6
Humanitarian intervention is a disputed concept for which no
normative rules exist, and many in the international community
have grappled with the question of whether and under what cir-
cumstances external actors may intervene in the affairs of a sov-
ereign state in order to halt humanitarian abuses. In order to fill
this legal vacuum, Koh has recently argued for the necessity of
developing a normative framework for the legality of humanitar-
ian intervention and has proposed such a framework.7 While the
proposed framework was developed by Koh in the context of
Syria, it could be applied to any future situations of humanitar-
ian suffering, and it would essentially change existing interna-
tional law by creating another instance of both legitimate and
legal use of force.
Currently, international law, as enshrined in the United Na-
tions Charter, prohibits states from using force against other
states except in two situations: pursuant to Security Council au-
thorization or in self-defense.8 In a situation like Syria, where
no particular nations can claim self-defense against the Assad
regime because the conflict has been internal and where the Se-
curity Council is paralyzed because one or more veto-wielding
nations are against military intervention,9 international law ap-
pears powerless to halt ongoing humanitarian abuses. Yet, most
tors_face_new_risks_in_syria (noting that the Syrian government “has contin-
ued its ‘constructive cooperation’” in the process of removing chemical weapons
from Syria and transporting them to a destruction site).
6 See id. (observing that while the chemical weapons inspection regime has
gone smoothly thus far, the United Nations Secretary-General has expressed
concern over the safety of inspectors in Syria and that Syria is still facing an
enormous humanitarian crisis “with more than 9 million civilians in need of
assistance, and more than 2.5 million people largely cut off from aid”).
7 See Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention
(Part II: International Law and the Way Forward), JUST SECURITY (Oct. 2,
2013, 9:00 AM), http://justsecurity.org/1506/koh-syria-part2/ [hereinafter Koh,
Part II].
8 See infra Part I.
9 See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Speakers Call for Voluntary Sus-
pension of Veto Rights in Cases of Mass Atrocity Crimes, as Security Council
Debates Working Methods, U.N. Press Release SC/11164 (Oct. 29, 2013),
http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11164.doc.htm (noting that “[w]hile ‘slow
and tortured’ improvements had helped the Security Council gradually build
greater transparency and efficiency, the 15-member body must urgently step
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commentators would agree that standing idle is not the most ap-
propriate response. Many international law scholars have pro-
posed preserving the existing international law rules as they
stand and developing policy arguments and factor-based excep-
tions to the ban on the use of force in order to justify military
interventions in some instances. 10 This was the approach
adopted by the United States Department of State during the
Kosovo crisis, and this is the preferred approach regarding
Syria, according to some scholars.11 Koh finds this approach un-
appealing and has instead argued in favor of developing a new
legal framework for humanitarian intervention because he ap-
propriately believes that it is the lawyers’ duty to work toward
developing new rules of international law when the old ones
prove insufficient and undesirable.12
Part I of this Article discusses the current state of affairs un-
der international law by focusing on the existing ban on the use
of force and the established exceptions thereto. It also discusses
various instances in which states have used force outside of this
legal framework. Part II discusses the developing concept of hu-
manitarian intervention as well as related theories, such as Re-
sponsibility to Protect and involuntary sovereignty waiver. Part
III focuses on the ongoing crisis in Syria and briefly describes
Syrian history and the current-day conflict. Part IV discusses
proposed justifications under existing international law for the
legality of military intervention in Syria. Part V examines Koh’s
proposed normative framework for humanitarian intervention
by critically assessing its elements and proposing additional cri-
teria. Part VI applies Koh’s framework to Syria and concludes
that Syria could constitute a perfect case for humanitarian in-
tervention under Koh’s proposed framework, should the Assad
regime choose to disobey the United Nations-imposed weapons
inspection and destruction regime. Ultimately, this Article
up efforts to improve its working methods, including through the collective vol-
untary suspension of veto rights in cases involving mass atrocity crimes”); see
also Ian Birrell, We Must End This UN 'Paralysis' on Syria, GUARDIAN (Sept.
8, 2013, 3:30 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentis-
free/2013/sep/08/un-paralysis-syria-security-council-russia (arguing that the
Security Council “paralysis” should come to an end in the context of Syria).
10 For a brief description of these arguments, see infra Part V.
11 See infra Part V.
12 See Koh, Part III, supra note 1; Koh, Part II, supra note 7.
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agrees that Koh’s proposed framework would constitute a bene-
ficial development in international law and that developing a
new normative framework, which would create another legal ex-
ception to the prohibition on the use of force, is necessary in to-
day’s world of internal warfare and humanitarian suffering.
Lawyers should not stand idle and support outdated concepts of
international law. Instead, lawyers should join Koh’s efforts in
developing new norms in order to legally justify the use of force
against states that abuse their own citizens and cause humani-
tarian catastrophes.
I. USE OF FORCEUNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law prohibits states from using force, ex-
cept in two situations: in self-defense or pursuant to the United
Nations Security Council’s authorization.13 This Part will dis-
cuss this basic norm, the two exceptions thereto, as well as ex-
amples from recent history where states have used force against
other states outside the two exceptions.
A. The Prohibition on the Use of Force
The prohibition on the use of force is a basic norm of interna-
tional law. The United Nations Charter states in Article 2(4)
that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state.”14 Under the Charter, na-
tions “agreed . . . to forgo the use of external force to change the
political status quo. Nations would be assured their fundamen-
tal independence, the enjoyment of their territory, their free-
dom—a kind of right to be let alone.”15 The International Court
of Justice has confirmed that the United Nations Charter rules
on the use of force were part of customary law with the character
of jus cogens norms.16
The prohibition on the use of force flows from the Charter’s
traditional conception of state sovereignty. Sovereignty has his-
13 See infra Part II.A.
14 U.N. Charter art.2, para. 4.
15 LOUISHENKIN, HOWNATIONS BEHAVE 137 (2d ed. 1979).
16 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 190 (June 27).
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torically implied that states were free to engage in whatever be-
havior they saw fit within their own borders.17 Moreover, states
could not intervene in the internal affairs of other states, regard-
less of how reprehensible such affairs may have been. Sover-
eignty functioned as a shield, protecting states from intrusion by
external actors.18 As Louis Henkin famously wrote: “The essen-
tial quality of statehood in a state system is the autonomy of
each state. State autonomy suggests that a state is not subject
to any external authority unless it has voluntarily consented to
such authority.”19
The idea of state sovereignty is reflected in several other doc-
trines of international law. One of the most significant of such is
the principle of uti possidetis. This principle protects the sanctity
of existing borders by proclaiming that “states emerging from
decolonization shall presumptively inherit the colonial adminis-
trative borders that they held at the time of independence.”20
Once such borders are set, they become international bounda-
ries, which all other actors in the international arena must re-
spect. Uti possidetis is tightly linked to the idea of state sover-
eignty: the notion that a state, as delineated by its borders, may
not be encroached upon by anybody in the international arena.
The International Court of Justice has confirmed that uti possi-
detis is a general principle of law whose “obvious purpose is to
prevent the independence and stability of new States.”21 Moreo-
ver, the principle of uti possidetis has been applied more broadly
to protect intra-state borders from subsequent change. The
17 For a general discussion of the traditional notion of international law and
state sovereignty, see Milena Sterio, The Evolution of International Law, 31
B.C. INT’L&COMP. L. REV. 213, 214 (2008).
18 The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sov-
ereignty correctly points out that sovereignty traditionally functioned as con-
trol. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 12–13 (Dec. 2001), available at http://responsibil-
itytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [hereinafter ICISS Report].
19 LOUISHENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 11 (1995).
20 Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of
New States, 90 AM. J. INT’L. L. 590, 590 (1996).
21 Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, ¶ 20 (Dec. 22). The In-
ternational Court of Justice has also discussed and affirmed the principle of
uti possidetis in Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.;
Nicar. intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351, ¶ 345 (Sept. 11) (“[T]his is a principle the
application of which is automatic: on independence, the boundaries of the rel-
evant colonial administrative divisions are transformed into international
frontiers.”).
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Badinter Commission, a body of experts appointed by the then
European Community to provide legal opinions on a series of dif-
ficult questions arising from the break-up of the former Yugosla-
via, affirmed and applied the principle of uti possidetis to the
republican borders existing between former Yugoslav states, el-
evating such provincial borders to the level of internationally
protected frontiers.22 The Badinter Commission’s opinion, not-
withstanding the significant criticism that it generated, demon-
strates that the world’s most prominent jurists were willing to
extend the applicability of uti possidetis to a situation where in-
tra-state borders were at stake in order to preserve status quo
and potentially prevent further territorial squabbles.23 How-
ever, the preservation and application of uti possidetis has led,
somewhat unfortunately, to the international community’s re-
luctance to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.
“[T]he extension of uti possidetis to modern breakups leads to
genuine injustices and instability by leaving significant popula-
tions both unsatisfied with their status in new states and uncer-
tain of political participation there.”24
In addition, the principle of non-intervention is another corol-
lary to the notion of state sovereignty and a consequence of the
United Nations’ Charter’s prohibition on the use of force against
states. The traditional notion of sovereignty also implied that
only states were relevant actors in international law; only states
could be subject to international norms and treaties, and any
prohibition on different types of behavior could only extend to
states.25 Thus, if a state chose to abuse its own population, this
was not a problem of international law as private individuals did
not constitute subjects of international law. Similar to the idea
that the international community would not intervene if such
intervention would result in the disturbance of state borders, the
concept of state sovereignty dictated that international law
should not intervene in matters occurring solely within such
22 Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 3, 31 I.L.M.
1499 (1992).
23 For criticism of the Badinter Commission Opinion No. 3, see Hurst Hannum,
Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT’L. L. 1, 38 (1993) (arguing that the
Commission’s “neo-decolonization territorial approach can have troubling con-
sequences if used to legitimize secession for groups possessing a distinct polit-
ical status while denying the right of secession to territorially based ethnic
communities not formally organized into political units”).
24 Ratner, supra note 20, at 591.
25 Sterio, supra note 17, at 216.
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state borders. “[I]nternational law . . . plac[es] a duty on all sov-
ereign states not, broadly speaking, to intervene in the internal
affairs of others. . . . [A] state has the international legal right,
the sovereign right, to conduct itself throughout its territory as,
by and large, it sees fit.”26 The principle of nonintervention, like
that of uti possidetis, flows from the concept of state sovereignty
and dictates that states have the right to be free of outside in-
terference. The application of uti possidetis essentially seals
state borders and prevents further change through forceful ac-
tion, and the principle of nonintervention further protects states,
as delineated by their protected borders, from subsequent en-
croachment by external actors. Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter is an illustration of this type of logic and a direct appli-
cation of the principles of sovereignty, uti possidetis, and nonin-
tervention.
B. Exceptions to the Prohibition
The United Nations Charter allows only two small exceptions
to the prohibition on the use of force. First, the Charter provides
for the right of self-defense.27 Pursuant to Article 51, every state,
if it has been the subject of an armed attack by another state or
a group of other states, may exercise its inherent right of self-
defense by militarily striking against the offending state(s).28
The right of self-defense inscribes itself neatly within the con-
ception of state sovereignty. If a state attacks another state, it
thereby acts against the sovereignty of the victim state. The sov-
ereignty shield has been broken, and the victim state may re-
spond militarily in order to defend itself. Self-defense does not
26 Alan James, The Concept of Sovereignty Revisited, in KOSOVO AND THE
CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: SELECTIVE INDIGNATION,
COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 334, 336 (Albrecht
Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur, eds., 2000).
27 Throughout history, much has been written about the international law of
self-defense. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF DEFENSE
(4th ed. 2005); see also J.L. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 872 (1947);
Jordan J. Paust, Use of Military Force in Syria by Turkey, NATO, and the
United States, 34 U. PA J. INT’L L. 431 (2013) (discussing the right of self-de-
fense in the context of Syria).
28 “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.” U.N. Charter art. 51.
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encroach on the notion of sovereignty because it is exercised by
the victim state, whose own sovereignty has already been bro-
ken, and because it is exercised against the attacker state,
which, to begin with, clearly did not respect the notion of sover-
eignty. Alternatively, a state that exercises military action
against another state in self-defense does not violate Article 2(4)
because its actions are not committed against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of the attacker state. Instead,
its actions are exercised out of self-protection and self-defense.
Second, the Charter allows for the possibility of collective mil-
itary action against an offending state, pursuant to the explicit
authorization of the Security Council.29 Here, the premise is
that state sovereignty is sacred—unless the Security Council de-
termines that it no longer is. The United Nations Charter was
negotiated in the wake of World War II, when victor countries
recognized the need to participate in a world organization in a
joint effort to preserve peace, but hung on to their superiority
and the need to preserve a political advantage in the global
arena.30 The compromise that emerged after rounds of negotia-
tions in San Francisco in 1945 reflected this tension.31 The new
organization was structured as a global forum preoccupied with
maintaining international peace and security, where all states
around the globe could participate on an equal footing within the
so-called General Assembly.32 The concept of state equality and
sovereignty is thus present throughout the United Nations
Charter. The super-sovereign states, however, preserved their
29 U.N. Charter art. 42 (“Should the Security Council consider that measures
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate,
it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to main-
tain or restore international peace and security.”).
30 See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 15, at 137–38 (noting that the states involved
in the negotiation of the U.N. Charter sought to outlaw war and that this was
their main objective).
31 See, e.g., History of the United Nations: San Francisco Conference, UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/sanfrancisco_confer-
ence.shtml (last visited Sept. 12, 2014) (noting that clashes of opinion over the
veto structure of the Security Council between states negotiating the U.N.
Charter in San Francisco in 1945 threatened to break up the conference).
32 For a general discussion of the history of the United Nations, see The For-
mation of the United Nations, 1945, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE
HISTORIAN, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/UN (last visited
Sept. 12, 2014).
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political, military, and economic advantage through the struc-
ture of the Security Council, where five permanent members
(United States, United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and
China) maintained veto power.33 The victor countries of World
War II, the so-called Great Powers, thereby preserved the right
to unilaterally determine the outcome of future sovereignty-en-
croaching actions by the United Nations, such as the authoriza-
tion to use force against a member state.
Because of the Cold War and the often politically conflicting
positions of the United States and the Soviet Union, the Security
Council remained relatively inactive throughout its initial four
decades of existence, authorizing the use of force on two occa-
sions: in Korea in 1950 and in Iraq in 1990 (the First Gulf
War).34 Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has
been more active, authorizing the deployment of troops for vari-
ous purposes. It has allowed a limited use of force by United Na-
tions peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, Soma-
lia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kosovo, and East Ti-
mor, and by regional arrangements, such as the ECOWAS Mis-
sion in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI), the European Union force in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR R.D. Congo), and
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).35 Further-
more, it has authorized the use of “all necessary means” or “all
necessary measures” by multinational forces in Somalia, Haiti,
Rwanda, Eastern Zaire, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, East
Timor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and
33 As of today, it is unlikely that the five permanent members of the Security
Council would accept changing the existing veto structure. At a recent meeting
in March 2013, representatives of the five permanent members declared the
following:
Many of reform proposals include a demand on elimination of veto
power of the permanent members or include a proposal to provide veto
powers to new permanent members. We would like to declare that our
delegations will not compromise to any of proposals which would
change the current veto structure.
Luka Kavčič, The Security Council Big Five: ‘Current Veto Structure Will Not
Change’, UN HERALD (Mar. 21, 2013), http://unherald.blog-
spot.com/2013/04/the-security-council-big-five-are-clear.html.
34 See Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/faq.shtml#measures (last visited Sept. 10,
2014).
35 Id.
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Iraq.36 The most recent example of Security Council authoriza-
tion to use force against a member state was Resolution 1973 in
2011, authorizing Member States, acting nationally or through
regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary
measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in Libya.37
The fact that the Security Council has authorized the use of mil-
itary force multiple times against multiple United Nations’
member states since the end of the Cold War illustrates the idea
that state sovereignty may no longer represent an ultimate
shield against external intervention, and that Article 2(4)’s pro-
hibition on the use of force can be circumvented through the Se-
curity Council’s consistent willingness to breach state sover-
eignty in certain situations.
However, most instances of Security Council approval for the
use of force have involved either limited mandates for the use of
force (for instance, to protect civilians in Libya or for specific
peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia,
East Timor, etc.) or missions led through regional organizations,
as in the case of ECOWAS, the European Union or the African
Union. Instances where the Security Council has approved the
general use of force by “all necessary means” against a United
Nations member state have remained limited and rare through-
out the organization’s history. This state of affairs exemplifies
the United Nations Charter’s preferred system, where the use of
force is a rare and limited exception to the otherwise generally
prevailing ban on the use of force. In negotiating the Charter,
states essentially agreed not to use force in the hope that peace
and security would be preserved throughout the world if every-
one agreed and respected the system.
C. States’ Use of Force Throughout Charter History
Throughout history, states have, of course, used force against
other states outside the paradigm of the United Nations Char-
ter. One circumstance under which states have used force
throughout the second half of the twentieth century is interven-
tion by a state to protect its nationals. Some have argued that a
state’s intervention to protect its nationals is an instance of self-
defense, which was lawful under customary law before the prom-
ulgation of the Charter, and has remained lawful under the
36 Id.
37 S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 11, 2011).
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Charter.38 Protection of nationals was relied upon by the British
government to support its armed intervention in Egypt during
the 1956 Suez Canal crisis; moreover, this was a ground ad-
vanced by the United States for its 1983 invasion of Grenada
and its 1989 invasion of Panama.39 In addition, states have ar-
gued that intervention to protect their nationals or rescue them
from being held hostage is a lawful use of force.40 Examples of
this include Israel’s intervention in Uganda to release Israeli
hostages from a hijacked plane at Entebbe and the United
States’ intervention in Iran to rescue hostages from the U.S. Em-
bassy.41
An additional paradigm under which states have used force
during the Cold War was intervention to support democracy or
other socialist regimes. President Reagan famously announced
in 1985 that freedommovements are “our brothers” and that “we
owe them our help.”42 This declaration gave rise to the so-called
“Reagan Doctrine”: the idea that the United States had the right
to intervene by force to defend democratic governments in other
states.43 Similarly, Soviet Union leader, Leonyd Brezhnev, as-
serted the right of socialist states to intervene in another state
if socialism was threatened there; this concept became known in
international law as the “Brezhnev Doctrine.”44
Both of the aforementioned paradigms advanced by states for
the use of force have failed to garner significant support by the
international community. Protection of nationals remains a nar-
row ground upon which states may attempt to justify the use of
force; however, the use of this narrow ground would not justify
38 D. W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87–90 (1958); see also
LORI F. DAMROSCH, LOUIS HENKIN, RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, OSCAR
SCHACHTER, HANS SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 973 (4th
ed.) [hereinafter DAMROSCH ET AL.]. But see IANBROWNLIE, INTERNATIONALLAW
AND THEUSE OFFORCE BYSTATES 301 (1963) (arguing against the legality of the
use of force through intervention to protect nationals).
39 DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 38, at 973–74.
40 Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THEUSE OF FORCE 37, 41–42 (2d ed. 1991).
41 DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 38, at 975.
42 W. Michael Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-
Cold War World: Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in LAW AND FORCE IN
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 26, 34 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J.
Scheffer, eds., 1991) (citation omitted).
43 Id.
44 The Brezhnev Doctrine manifested itself in 1968 through the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 38, at 977.
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the use of large-scale military force against a regime, and would
certainly not legitimize a humanitarian intervention to rescue
nationals of the offending regime. Both the Reagan and the
Brezhnev Doctrines were rejected by the International Court of
Justice in the Nicaragua case, which held that “[t]he Court can-
not contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a right of
intervention by one State against another on the ground that the
latter has opted for some particular ideology or political sys-
tem.”45 In sum, states have at times referred to these grounds to
justify their use of force against fellow states, but these sporadic
types of military action have done little to change the existing
customary law and its Charter-driven ban on the use of force.
Mindful of the Charter system and its prohibition on the use
of force, states have at other times attempted to justify their mil-
itary actions by advancing legal arguments consistent with the
Charter itself. In most instances, states have argued that their
military action constitutes an instance of self-defense: individ-
ual, collective, traditional, preventative, or preemptive. The for-
mer Soviet Union has claimed that it was exercising self-defense
when it intervened in Afghanistan in 1979.46 Russia, its succes-
sor state, made a similar argument when it sent troops into the
Georgian breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
in 2008.47 The United States claimed self-defense numerous
times in the 1980s, when President Reagan launched military
incursions into Panama, Grenada, Haiti, and Nicaragua.48 Most
of the latter instances of use of force by the United States in-
45 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S,), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 263 (June 27).
46 The Soviet Union claimed that it had been invited by the then Afghan Prime
Minister Amin to help him stabilize his government in its fight against an Is-
lamic insurgency throughout the country; the Soviet claim was essentially one
of collective self-defense. See Russian Invasion of Afghanistan, HISTORY
LEARNING SITE, http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/russia_invasion_afghan-
istan.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2014).
47 For a detailed discussion of the 2008 “war” involving Russia and Georgia,
see MILENA STERIO, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW: “SELFISTANS,” SECESSION, AND THE RULE OF THE GREAT POWERS 86–88
(2013).
48 DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 38, at 937 (noting that U.S. representatives,
during military incursions into Grenada, Nicaragua, and Panama in the 1980s,
continued to rely on the validity of the U.N. Charter and sought to justify
American actions under that law).
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volved a claim of so-called anticipatory or preventative self-de-
fense. This means that the other state was in fact the aggressor
about to harm the United States and so the United States could
strike in anticipation or preventively against that other state in
order to prevent the harm from occurring.49 During the second
Bush Administration, the concept of self-defense evolved to a
new level. The so-called “Bush Doctrine” attempted to justify the
use of force through preemptive self-defense.50 This novel con-
cept implied that the United States could use force against an-
other state if that state acted in ways that could potentially
harm the United States at some point in the future. Thus, in-
stead of waiting for the “enemy” to move closer to its alleged goal
of harming the United States, the Bush Doctrine authors
claimed that the United States could strike preemptively
49 Id. at 966–67 (describing the circumstances giving rise to the 1989 military
action against Panama, which were, according to the then President George
H.W. Bush, exercised in self-defense). For a general discussion of anticipatory
self-defense, see Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1633–35 (1984).
50 The Bush Doctrine was developed in the National Security Strategy of the
United States, published on September 17, 2002. This strategic document
stated the following:
The security environment confronting the United States today is rad-
ically different from what we have faced before. Yet the first duty of
the United States Government remains what it always has been: to
protect the American people and American interests. It is an enduring
American principle that this duty obligates the government to antici-
pate and counter threats, using all elements of national power, before
the threats can do grave damage. The greater the threat, the greater
is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains
as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. There are few greater
threats than a terrorist attack with WMD.
To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United
States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent
right of self-defense. The United States will not resort to force in all
cases to preempt emerging threats. Our preference is that nonmilitary
actions succeed. And no country should ever use preemption as a pre-
text for aggression.
NAT’LSEC. COUNCIL, THENATIONALSECURITYSTRATEGY: PREVENTOURENEMIES
FROM THREATENINGUS, OURALLIES, ANDOUR FRIENDS WITHWEAPONS OFMASS
DESTRUCTION ¶¶ 1–2 (2006), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/print/sectionV.html.
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against the offending state or nonstate actor,51 without having
to wait for that state to get critically closer to amassing an attack
on the United States.52
States other than the Great Powers have also invoked self-de-
fense to justify their use of force against other states. Both Azer-
baijan and Armenia have claimed self-defense throughout their
military actions against each other over the disputed Nagorno-
Karabakh region,53 and Israel has claimed self-defense in most
of its wars with Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. 54 Additionally,
51 In the wake of 9/11, some scholars have asserted that international law has
evolved to allow states to exercise self-defense, whether traditional or preemp-
tive, against nonstate actors as well. As evidence of this, scholars have cited
Security Council Resolution 1368, which confirmed the right to use force in
self-defense against nonstate actors (al Qaeda), thereby confirming the idea
that international law authorizes states to use force in self-defense against
nonstate actors. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (calling
on states to “work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organ-
izers and sponsors” of the attacks and reaffirming the inherent right of self-
defense in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter in the context of 9/11
terrorist attacks). SeeMichael P. Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian Moment”: Accel-
erated Formation of Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental
Change, 43 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 439, 451–52 (2010).
52 President Bush made clear that the role of preemptive strikes would be sig-
nificant in any future American national defense and foreign policy. In a
speech to the U.S. Military Academy (West Point) cadets in 2002, he stated the
following: “We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best.
We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-prolif-
eration treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to
fully materialize, we will have waited too long. . . . Our security will require
transforming the military you will lead—a military that must be ready to
strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security
will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for
preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our
lives.” Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, President Bush
Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point (June 1, 2002), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/re-
leases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html.
53 For a detailed briefing of the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, see INT’L CRISIS
GRP., Armenia and Azerbaijan: A Season of Risks, EUROPE BRIEFING NO. 71
(Sept. 26, 2013), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/eu-
rope/caucasus/b071-armenia-and-azerbaijan-a-season-of-risks.pdf.
54 For a detailed discussion of Israeli wars with Lebanon, and Syria involving
claims of self-defense, see STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST
THEUSE OFFORCE IN INTERNATIONALLAW 173–79 (1996). For a discussion of the
Israeli war with Egypt, including a discussion of Israel’s position of anticipa-
tory self-defense against Egypt, see JOHN QUIGLEY, THE SIX-DAY WAR AND
ISRAELI SELF-DEFENSE 123–26 (2013).
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scholars have discussed whether NATO air-strikes against the
former Yugoslavia in 1999, in aid of Kosovar Albanians, could
have represented an instance of legitimate collective self-de-
fense.55 This Article does not attempt to discuss the validity of
each of these self-defense claims, nor to evaluate the legal sound-
ness of doctrines such as preventive or preemptive self-defense.
Instead, this Article limits itself to observing that while many
states may feel that the current norms on the use of force, as
they exist within the United Nations structure, are unfair or in-
flexible, most states actually advance legal arguments pursuant
to such norms whenever they use force against other states.
At times, states have chosen not to legally justify their military
actions within the existing legal structure of the United Nations,
but instead have offered nonlegal rationales to support their be-
havior or have claimed that their actions were necessary because
of an extraordinary situation. First, states have made nonlegal
arguments to support their use of force against other states.
Most notably, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) coun-
tries asserted a moral, humanitarian rationale to justify their
prolonged air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in 1999. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo,
chaired by Richard Goldstone and Carl Tham, asserted in its
post-intervention analysis the following interpretation of the
evolution of humanitarian intervention doctrine, which well re-
flected the views of many NATO countries having participated
in the air strikes: “This interpretation is a situation in a gray
zone of ambiguity between an extension of international law and
55 See, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, The Kosovo Situation and NATO Military Ac-
tion, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (Mar. 12, 1999), http://www.asil.org/in-
sights/volume/4/issue/1/kosovo-situation-and-nato-military-action. For more
scholarly debate on Kosovo, see the American Journal of International Law
93/4, October 1999, available at http://www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm (Editorial
Comments: NATO's Kosovo Intervention). See e.g., Louis Henkin, Kosovo and
the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention,” 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824 (1999); Ruth
Wedgwood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 828 (1999);
Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93
AM. J. INT’L L. 834 (1999); Christine M. Chinkin, Kosovo: A "Good" or "Bad"
War?, 93 AM. J. INT’LL. 841 (1999); Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and
the Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 852 (1999); Thomas M.
Franck, Lessons of Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 857 (1999); W. Michael Reisman,
Kosovo's Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 860 (1999).
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a proposal for an international moral consensus.”56 In fact, most
of the countries involved in the air strikes chose not to use legal
arguments to support the validity of their use of force, and most
of these countries adopted a moral, nonlegal rhetoric.57 Asichard
Goldstone, the chair of the above-mentioned International Com-
mission on Kosovo, famously argued that the use of force against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was illegal but legitimate be-
cause “although a right of humanitarian intervention was not
consistent with the U.N. Charter if conceived as a legal text, it
might, depending on the context, reflect the spirit of the Charter
as it pertained to the overall protection of people against gross
abuse.”58 Second, during the same Kosovo bombing campaign,
the United States, which was one of the main actors and insti-
gators of the air strikes, used the following “exceptionalism”
rhetoric: the then Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, continu-
ously referred to Kosovo as “sui generis”—a case which does not
create a precedent because of Kosovo’s unique situation.59 Ac-
56 INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT,
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 164 (2000) [hereinafter Kosovo
Comm’n].
57 For example, a few days before the start of the NATO-led aerial strikes
against the former Yugoslavia in 1999, the spokesperson for the U.S. Depart-
ment of State stated that “[w]e and our NATO allies have looked to numerous
factors in concluding that such action, if necessary, would be justified” and that
“we and our NATO allies believe there are legitimate grounds to threaten and,
if necessary, use military force.” Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 628, 631 (1999).
But see the position of the United Kingdom government: “We are in no doubt
that NATO is acting within international law and our legal justification rests
upon the accepted principle that force may be used in extreme circumstances
to avert a humanitarian catastrophe.” Simon Duke, Hans-Georg Ehrhart &
Matthias Karadi, The Major European Allies: France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: SELECTIVE INDIGNATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND
INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 26, at 128, 137.
58 KOSOVOCOMM’N, supra note 56, at 186. For Goldstone’s position that the Ko-
sovo intervention was illegal but legitimate, see Ian Williams, The NS Inter-
view: Richard Goldstone, NEW STATESMAN (Dec. 30, 2009),
http://www.newstatesman.com/middle-east/2010/01/interview-israel-law.
59 U.S. Rules Out Recognising South Ossetia, CIVIL.GE DAILY NEWS ONLINE
(Mar. 6, 2008, 11:45 AM), http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17273. See
KOSOVOCOMM’N, supra note 56, at 174 (“NATO and its supporters have wisely
avoided staking out any doctrinal claims for its action either prior to or after
the war. Rather than defining the Kosovo intervention as a precedent, most
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cording to Rice, the use of force in Kosovo had been justified be-
cause of the unique factors present in that situation, including
the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, of which Kosovo had been
a province, and the extraordinary force used by the Milosevic re-
gime against Kosovar Albanians.60 Similarly, the United Na-
tions Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, has referred to Kosovo
as a “highly distinctive situation” because of the involvement of
the international community in this volatile region.61
Once again, this Article does not attempt to assess the validity
of this type of sui generis claim; instead, it will point out that
states, including arguably the most powerful ones, always refer
to the existing use of force framework in their legal arguments
to justify a specific instance of use of force, and if a solid legal
argument cannot be worked out, they resort to claiming that a
particular use of force was exceptional and a peculiar situation.
Countries like the United States presumably make this type of
argument because they are uncomfortable with the idea that any
other nation could use force outside the confines of the United
Nations system. Most countries presumably also believe that
any use of force should remain exceptional and rare, which is
why the use of force to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe has
met solid resistance. While many countries probably agree that
all humanitarian suffering should be stopped, they often disa-
gree about whether using military force outside of the United
Nations system to prevent the suffering is justified.
The following section will provide a brief background on the
notion of humanitarian intervention and will also discuss more
novel developments such as the Responsibility to Protect doc-
trine and the theory of involuntary sovereignty waiver.
II. THE EMERGING CONCEPT OFHUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Humanitarian intervention has emerged as a vertical re-
straint on state behavior during the second half of the twentieth
century. It is closely linked to other theories, such as Responsi-
bility to Protect and involuntary sovereignty waiver, both of
NATO supporters among international jurists presented the intervention as
an unfortunate but necessary and reasonable exception.”).
60 U.S. Rules Out Recognising South Ossetia, supra note 59.
61 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon: I Wish to Note that Kosovo is a Highly
Distinctive Situation, INTERFAX, http://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20080314204124/http://www.interfax.com/17/373003/Inter-
view.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
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which contemplate instances where external actors may be jus-
tified in intervening in the internal affairs of a rogue regime that
has chosen to abuse its own population.
A. Origins of Humanitarian Intervention
Throughout the twentieth century, international law evolved
from a set of norms governing inter-state behavior to a complex
maze of rules, regulations, codes, and directives covering not just
states but also a variety of nonstate actors, including the indi-
vidual.62 Norms governing state behavior vis-à-vis individuals
living within state borders developed during the second half of
the last century. The fields of human rights law and humanitar-
ian law evolved, imposing a whole new set of prohibitions on
state actors.63 The notion of humanitarian intervention, which
emerged over the past few decades, positions itself in the midst
of the human rights movement because the use of force by a state
actor against another state actor in order to prevent individual
or group suffering implies that the protection of the individual
is important enough to justify a breach of state sovereignty.
Scholars have labeled this phenomenon as “revolutionary” be-
cause “it contradicts the notion of national sovereignty—that is,
that a state can do as it pleases in its own jurisdiction.”64 The
state that launches a humanitarian intervention will encroach
upon the sovereignty of the state that has been abusing human
rights; the interventionist state will thus use force against the
abuser. The concept of humanitarian intervention is a so-called
vertical constraint on states, whereby external norms are im-
posed on otherwise sovereign states “by diplomatic and public
persuasion, coercion, shaming, economic sanctions, isolation,
and in more egregious cases, by humanitarian intervention.”65
The use of force for humanitarian purposes does not fall within
the exceptions to the overall ban on any use of force, namely self-
defense and Security Council authorization. In most instances of
humanitarian intervention, the intervening state is not acting
62 See Sterio, supra note 17, at 214–15.
63 Id. at 226–32 (discussing changes in international human rights law through
the creation of new norms and the development of limitations on state sover-
eignty).
64 DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMANRIGHTS ANDWORLD POLITICS 6 (2d ed. 1983).
65 John Alan Cohan, Sovereignty in a Postsovereign World, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L.
907, 941 (2006).
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in self-defense because its own interests and borders are not be-
ing threatened. Moreover, in most instances, the Security Coun-
cil does not become involved because of a permanent member’s
veto.66 If the Security Council were to become involved, then any
use of force would presumably be authorized through a Council
resolution and the humanitarian intervention would be legal
and justified under the current Charter structure. However, be-
cause the Security Council has experienced frequent paralysis,
a state may decide to take military action in order to prevent a
humanitarian catastrophe, either on its own or through a coali-
tion of other willing states. This situation is one of true human-
itarian intervention, where the intervening state or states need
to invoke this emerging norm of international law in order to
justify their use of force.67 Recent examples of humanitarian in-
tervention include the 1991 United Nations-sanctioned inter-
vention in north Iraq in order to protect the Kurds,68 the 1999
air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,69 as well
as the more remote actions by India in East Pakistan in order to
“liberate” Bangladesh, and by Tanzania in Uganda in order to
oust dictator Idi Amin.70
Humanitarian intervention has been an important subject of
discussion among states and in particular, more recently in the
66 See, e.g., BRIAN D. LEPARD, RETHINKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A
FRESH LEGAL APPROACH BASED ON FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL PRINCIPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD RELIGIONS 362 (2002) (noting that Security
Council members’ vetoes have blocked humanitarian interventions in the
past).
67 See Inocencio Arias, Humanitarian Intervention: Could the Security Council
Kill the United Nations?, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1005, 1011 (noting the legal
difficulty faced by states that engaged in a non-Security Council authorized
humanitarian intervention because the “split in the Security Council—and the
resulting gridlock created by the veto power of the Permanent Members—
places any international intervention, no matter how apocalyptic the outrage
being committed, in legal quicksand.”).
68 Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Judicial Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 384 (2003).
69 For a discussion of the 1999 NATO air strikes in Kosovo as precedent for
humanitarian intervention, see Fernando R. Tesón, Kosovo: A Powerful Prece-
dent for the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 1 AMSTERDAM L. FORUM 43
(2009); AIDAN HEHIR, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AFTER KOSOVO: IRAQ,
DARFUR AND THE RECORD OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY (2008); Ciarãn Burke &
Martijn Stronks, Kosovo, Georgia: Humanitarian Intervention and Independ-
ence, 1 AMSTERDAM L. F. 1 (2009).
70 Koh, Part II, supra note 7.
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context of the 1999 air strikes against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. In 1999, NATO countries engaged in a series of aer-
ial attacks against Yugoslav leadership in order to halt ethnic
violence that was being perpetrated against Kosovar Albani-
ans.71 The Security Council was deadlocked because of Russian
and Chinese opposition to any military action against the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia, and the NATO campaign took place
outside of the confines of the Charter-sanctioned use of force
structure.72 Thus, this campaign can be viewed as an instance of
humanitarian intervention. The campaign nonetheless provoked
controversy. NATO justified the intervention in Yugoslavia as a
humanitarian operation, fought “to avert a humanitarian catas-
trophe by disrupting the violent attacks currently being carried
out by the Yugoslav security forces against the Kosovo Albani-
ans and to limit their ability to conduct such repression in the
future.”73 Many agreed with the NATO-asserted humanitarian
rationale, and some scholars supported the intervention by ar-
guing that humanitarian action can be justified “where a gov-
ernment or effective authority actively exterminates its popu-
lace, or where it denies to it that which is necessary for its sur-
vival, or where it forcibly displaces it.”74 Others, however, were
more critical. Some scholars argued that the NATO intervention
was illegal under international law and the existing Charter sys-
tem because of the inherent danger of adopting a humanitarian
rationale to authorize future uses of force. “[I]f it is accepted hat
a state or group of states can unilaterally decide to intervene . .
. [t]he door will have been opened to all sorts of subjective claims
as to when interventions are justified and when they are not.”75
Some have questioned the NATO countries’ allegedly humani-
tarian motivation by asking why NATO countries were not will-
ing to intervene in other equally problematic areas.76 Others
71 For a detailed discussion of the 1999 Kosovo air strikes, see James Mayall,
The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention Revisited, in KOSOVO AND THE
CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: SELECTIVE INDIGNATION,
COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 26, at 319–
33.
72 Id. at 327.
73 This statement was issued by the British Secretary of Defence, George Rob-
ertson. Paul Rogers, Lessons to Learn, 55 WORLD TODAY, no. 8/9, at 4–6 (1999).
74 Marc Weller, Armed Samaritans, COUNSEL, at 20–22 (Aug. 1999).
75 Michael Byers, Kosovo: An Illegal Operation, COUNSEL, at 16–18 (Aug. 1999).
76 Mayall, supra note 71, at 331.
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have suggested the need to reform the Security Council by elim-
inating the veto structure and by replacing it with a voting ma-
jority.77
Despite the initial lack of consensus on the status of humani-
tarian intervention within international law, it is clear that
states have continuously debated the concept of humanitarian
intervention and have at times accepted its legitimacy. The sec-
tions below will discuss two concepts related to intervention: Re-
sponsibility to Protect and involuntary sovereignty waiver, both
of which provide evidence that the international community is
becoming increasingly comfortable with breaking the sover-
eignty shield and discussing the possibility of intervention
against rogue regimes.
B. Responsibility to Protect
The term “Responsibility to Protect” was first coined in the
2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS), a commission formed in response
to Kofi Annan’s question of when the international community
must intervene in order to stop humanitarian suffering.78 In es-
sence, ICISS was tasked with ascertaining when the principle of
state sovereignty should yield to some type of intervention aimed
at preventing a human rights and humanitarian crisis. The
ICISS Report noted a shift from the traditional notion of “sover-
eignty as control” toward “sovereignty as responsibility in both
international functions and external duties.”79 Despite its prom-
ising start, the concept of Responsibility to Protect failed to gar-
ner significant state support because of two devastating events:
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the March 2003 United States’ invasion of Iraq.80
Most states remained focused on preventing further terrorist at-
77 Catherine Guicherd, International Law and the War in Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL,
no. 2, Summer 1999, at 25.
78 ICISS Report, supra note 18; see also Max W. Mathews, Note, Tracking the
Emergence of a New International Norm: the Responsibility to Protect and the
Crisis in Darfur, 31 B.C. INT’L&COMP. L. REV. 137 (2008).
79 ICISS Report, supra note 18, sec. 2.14.
80 See INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, An Introduction to
the Responsibility to Protect, RESP. TO PROTECT, § 1, http://www.responsibil-
itytoprotect.org/index.php/about-rtop/learn-about-rtop (last visited Sept. 24,
2014) [hereinafter INT’LCOALITION].
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tacks, and many states feared that any intervention-type doc-
trine like Responsibility to Protect would be used in the future
to justify another Iraq-like invasion.81 Kofi Annan however con-
tinued to promote Responsibility to Protect.82 In addition, the
African Union countries embraced the concept of Responsibility
to Protect by including it in the Constitutive Act of the organiza-
tion’s Charter.83 In fact, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act
states that it is the “right of the Union to intervene in a Member
State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave
circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity,”84 which reflects the African Union member states’
commitment to Responsibility to Protect as it authorizes mem-
ber states to intervene in each other’s affairs in order to prevent
humanitarian catastrophes from occurring.
Ultimately, by 2005, Responsibility to Protect garnered
enough support to result in the creation of the World Summit
Outcome Document, a document agreed to by the heads of state
present at that year’s World Summit.85 Paragraphs 138–139
stipulate the following: that each individual state has the pri-
mary Responsibility to Protect its populations from genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing; that
the international community should assist and encourage states
to exercise this responsibility; and that the international com-
munity has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, hu-
manitarian and other peaceful means to help protect popula-
tions threatened by these crimes.86 In addition, this Document
stipulates that “when a state manifestly fails in its protection
81 Id.
82 As part of his effort to promote Responsibility to Protect, in 2003, the U.N.
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, formed the High-level Panel on Threats, Chal-
lenges and Change to report on how the U.N. should confront the greatest se-
curity threats of the twenty-first century. Moreover, the Secretary-General
published his own report entitled In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All, in which, similar to the High-level Panel,
he emphasized the need of governments to take action against threats of mas-
sive human rights violations and other large scale acts of violence against ci-
vilians. INT’LCOALITION, supra note 80.
83 ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, CONSTITUTIVE ACT OF THE AFRICAN UNION (July 11,
2000), available at http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm.
84 Id.
85 INT’LCOALITION, supra note 80, § 4.
86 Id.
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responsibilities, and peaceful means are inadequate, the inter-
national community must take stronger measures, including col-
lective use of force authorized by the Security Council though its
Chapter VII powers.”87
Since the 2005 World Summit, Responsibility to Protect has
experienced several important advancements. First, the Secu-
rity Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1674 on the Pro-
tection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, which includes the first
official Security Council reference to the Responsibility to Pro-
tect.88 Second, the Security Council also passed Resolution 1706,
authorizing the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping
troops in Darfur, which referred to Resolution 1674 and para-
graphs 138 and 139 on the Responsibility to Protect in the 2005
World Summit Outcome Document.89 Third, several Security
Council resolutions have focused on the protection of civilians in
conflict areas and have indirectly referenced Responsibility to
Protect. In 2011, Resolution 1970 called upon Libya’s “Responsi-
bility to Protect” by referring the situation to the International
Criminal Court and imposing financial sanctions as well as an
arms embargo.90 Resolution 1973 called for the enforcement of a
no-fly zone and for “all necessary measures . . . to protect civil-
ians and civilian populated areas under threat or attack. . . .
[w]hile excluding a foreign occupation force of any form.”91 This
Resolution condemned the Libyan government for failing to com-
ply with international law and for allowing gross violations of
human rights and attacks that may amount to crimes against
humanity.92 Also, in 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolu-
tion 1975 on Cote d’Ivoire, condemning human rights violations
occurring against the civilian population in this country that
could amount to crimes against humanity.93 Moreover, this Res-
olution stated that it was the primary responsibility of each state
to protect civilians and reaffirmed the U.N. mandate in Cote
d’Ivoire to use all necessary means to protect civilians.94 These
sets of resolutions focusing on two conflict areas, Libya and Cote
87 Id.
88 S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
89 S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006).
90 S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
91 S.C. Res. 1973, paras. 4–12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
92 Id. at 1.
93 S.C. Res. 1975, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1975 (Mar. 30, 2011).
94 Id. at 2.
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d’Ivoire, reflect the notion that the Security Council member
states believe that each state has a Responsibility to Protect ci-
vilians within its own borders and more importantly, should a
state fail to protect civilians, it is appropriate and important for
the Security Council to use force in order to stabilize the area
and prevent further humanitarian suffering.
While it can be argued that Responsibility to Protect is a newly
emerging norm of customary law, this theory has not reached
the status of binding law yet. Recent opposition by states to the
use of Responsibility to Protect demonstrates the lack of con-
sistent state practice needed for the creation of a customary
norm. In 2007, Russia and China “vetoed a resolution within the
Security Council on the situation in Burma, arguing that Burma
did not pose a threat to international peace and security,” that
the internal affairs of a sovereign state should not be debated
within the Security Council, and that the situation should in-
stead be referred to the Human Rights Council.95 In addition,
Security Council member states failed to refer to Responsibility
to Protect in the Darfur Resolution, which had authorized the
deployment of a hybrid United Nations-African Union military
force in this troubled region, but which did not specifically refer-
ence the emerging theory of Responsibility to Protect.96 “As com-
pared to the earlier Resolution 1674, this limited endorsement
was disappointing to the community of civil society and policy-
makers working to advance the norm.”97
Moreover, states have opposed Responsibility to Protect out-
side of the Security Council: on budgetary matters, in the Gen-
eral Assembly, and regarding appointments to specialized
United Nations positions related to Responsibility to Protect.
First, during the General Assembly's fifth Committee bi-annual
budget debate, the Committee refused to fund the office of the
new Special Adviser on Responsibility to Protect.98 While this
decision was partly caused by other procedural matters, it none-
theless reflected some member states’ viewpoint that Responsi-
bility to Protect had actually never been agreed to as a norm
during the 2005 World Summit. Additionally, on February 21,
2008, the office of the Secretary-General announced the appoint-
ment of Edward Luck as a Special Adviser with a focus on the
95 INT’LCOALITION, supra note 80.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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Responsibility to Protect populations from genocide, ethnic
cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity.99 This of-
fice has been previously titled “Special Adviser on the Responsi-
bility to Protect”;100 it is reasonable to assume that this title
change reflected the resistance to this position from some United
Nations Member States.
Most importantly, this theory, even if it were to become bind-
ing law, does not alter the existing rules on the use of force under
international law because Responsibility to Protect places any
kind of military intervention against an offending state within
the existing Security Council structure. In other words, although
states have the Responsibility to Protect their populations from
humanitarian suffering, it is up to the international community,
through the Security Council, to force states into compliance
through a potential use of military force. Responsibility to Pro-
tect does not authorize states to use force against other states in
an effort to prevent humanitarian suffering.
Finally, any implementation of Responsibility to Protect has
been slow. On January 12, 2009, the United Nations Secretary-
General issued a report entitled “Implementing the Responsibil-
ity to Protect.”101 The report presented a three-pillar approach.
First, Pillar One stresses that states have the primary Respon-
sibility to Protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.102 Second, Pillar
Two emphasizes the necessity for the international community
to assist States directly in building the latter’s capacity to pro-
tect their populations from themost heinous crimes, such as gen-
ocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against human-
ity. Pillar Two also stresses the need to assist those populations
which live under dire conditions before a crisis or conflict break
out. Furthermore, it “addresses the commitment of the interna-
tional community to provide assistance to States in building ca-
pacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting
those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep.
of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Im-
plementing RtoP].
102 Id. pt. II.
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out.”103 Finally, Pillar Three focuses on the responsibility of the
international community to take action to prevent genocide, eth-
nic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity when a
state is manifestly failing to protect its population.104 The Sec-
retary-General’s report urged the General Assembly to develop
a strategy for implementing Responsibility to Protect, as de-
scribed in the report. 105 The General Assembly passed a resolu-
tion on September 14, 2009, whereby it accepted to continue con-
sidering Responsibility to Protect.106 Since 2009, the General
Assembly member states have engaged in multiple debates and
dialogues about Responsibility to Protect, but as of now, member
states have not progressed further than agreeing to continue
“considering” this concept.107 Despite the Secretary-General’s
report and his continuous urging of states to implement Respon-
sibility to Protect, states have resisted any real implementation,
and this concept has simply remained a subject of discussion on
the General Assembly’s agenda.
While Responsibility to Protect may remain a controversial
subject of future discussions and while its implementation may
appear doubtful, the fact remains that states seem at least will-
ing to debate the concept, showing thereby their readiness to dis-
cuss sovereignty-encroaching theories. In this sense, Responsi-
bility to Protect is revolutionary.
C. Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver
The theory of involuntary sovereignty waiver is another con-
cept that purports to legitimize intervention in the affairs of a
sovereign state if the state abuses its own population, thereby
prioritizing the protection of human rights over state sover-
eignty. The term “involuntary sovereignty waiver” was first ar-
ticulated in the United States’ policy, as articulated by Richard
Haass, the Director of Policy Planning for the State Department
in the George W. Bush Administration and the current Presi-
dent of the Council on Foreign Relations.108 Haass argued that
103 Id. pt. III.
104 Implementing RtoP, supra note 101, pt. IV.
105 Id. para. 71
106 G.A. Res. 63/308, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Oct. 7, 2009).
107 See INT’LCOALITION, supra note 80, § 8.
108 Haass initially developed his theory in 2002, arguing that states waive their
sovereignty if they commit atrocities against their own people or if they harbor
terrorists. Nicholas Lemann, The Next World Order, NEW YORKER, Apr. 1,
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rogue states “waive” their sovereignty, inviting thereby inter-
vention by outside actors if they commit one of the following sets
of acts: harboring weapons of mass destruction; sponsoring or
protecting terrorists; and committing humanitarian abuses.109
According to Haass, such rogue states can no longer claim the
protection of their otherwise inherent sovereignty shield and can
be intruded upon by outside actors wishing to eradicate rogue
behavior. 110 Thus, Haass claimed that “sovereignty is not a
blank check” and that “outlaw regimes” jeopardize their sover-
eignty “by pursuing reckless policies fraught with danger for
their citizens and the international community.”111 Haass ar-
gued, however, that such outside intervention could be staged by
one of the powerful states themselves, such as the United States,
without any involvement on behalf of the United Nations or di-
rect approval by the Security Council.112 According to Haass’ ar-
gument, humanitarian intervention would be one of the excep-
tions to the general ban on the use of force, under which powerful
2002, at 45–46; Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Invol-
untary Sovereignty Waiver”—Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Re-
turn to Rule by the Great Powers?, 10UCLA J. INT’LL. &FOREIGNAFF. 361, 401
(2005). Haass amended his theory in 2003 by including states that pursue
weapons of mass destructions. Richard N. Haass, Dir. of the Policy Planning,
U.S. Dept. of State, Remarks to the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara
Center for International Studies at Georgetown University: Sovereignty: Ex-
isting Rights, Evolving Responsibilities (Jan. 14, 2003), in INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 698–700 (Henry J. Steiner et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008)
[hereinafter Georgetown Speech].
109 Georgetown Speech, supra note 108.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Georgetown Speech, supra note 108, at 698. While Haass does not specifi-
cally articulate that powerful countries, like the United States, can stage mil-
itary actions unilaterally without Security Council authorization, under the
involuntary sovereignty waiver theory, this argument is implicit in Haass’ ar-
ticulated policy. See Michael J. Kelly, Sovereignty Redux: The ICJ Ruling in
Congo v. Uganda, JURIST (Dec. 22, 2005, 8:01 AM), http://jurist.org/fo-
rum/2005/12/sovereignty-redux-icj-ruling-in-congo.php (arguing that Haass’
policy on involuntary sovereignty waiver provided the Bush Administration
with a much-needed rationale to support the 2003 invasion, which, because of
the lack of Security Council authorization, would otherwise have constituted
an illegal war).
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states could engage in unilateral military action against a rogue
state in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe.113
It is unclear whether Haass intended for this theory to apply
to states other than the United States or its allies; it is also un-
clear that any other scholars or states have embraced this
view.114 Nonetheless, the involuntary sovereignty waiver theory
illustrates the United States Administration’s willingness to
acknowledge the existence of a humanitarian intervention-type
justification for the use of unilateral military force. This type of
argument, like the concept of Responsibility to Protect, demon-
strates states’ willingness to debate and potentially propose
novel theories on the use of force, which could break the tradi-
tional sovereignty shield and authorize force outside of the con-
fines of the United Nations Charter system.
In light of the above, it can be argued that humanitarian in-
tervention is an emerging norm of international law and that
together with theories such as Responsibility to Protect and in-
voluntary sovereignty waiver, it demonstrates the international
community’s struggle to strike the right balance between tradi-
tional norms of state sovereignty and the modern-day need for
external military involvement in bloody civil wars. In other
words, while the international community seems ready to dis-
cuss sovereignty-breaking concepts, such as humanitarian inter-
vention, Responsibility to Protect, and involuntary sovereignty
waiver, the precise status and content of these theories have re-
mained in flux. The catastrophic situation in Syria, which is ex-
plored below, illustrates the weakness of this type of approach:
when international law is uncertain or prohibitive of military
action against a rogue regime, such a regime can benefit from
the situation and provoke unimaginable suffering.
113 For a detailed discussion of Haass’ view, see Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the
Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver”—Revolutionary In-
ternational Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great Powers?, 10 UCLA J.
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 403–04 (2005).
114 Scholars have discussed Haass’ theory in the context of an evolving “rule”
by the Great Powers—the most powerful states on the international stage,
such as the Security Council permanent members (United States, Russia,
China, France, and Great Britain) and other economically, politically, and mil-
itarily powerful states (e.g., Germany, Japan, and Italy). Because Haass ar-
gued that interventions could be unilaterally staged by powerful countries, like
the Great Powers, against “rogue” regimes, scholars have wondered whether
this constitutes a return to a Great Powers’ Rule. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note
113; STERIO, supra note 47.
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III. BACKGROUND ON SYRIA
Many discussions about the use of force under the paradigm of
humanitarian intervention have recently taken place in the con-
text of Syria, where a violent civil war has threatened both the
stability of this volatile nation, as well as the Middle-Eastern
regional geo-political equilibrium. This section explores the his-
tory of Syria, leading up to its fragile present state.
Syria is a multi-ethnic nation and home to a majority of Arab
Sunnis and many other minority groups, such as Arab Alawites,
Christians, Armenians, Assyrians, Druze, Kurds, and Turks.115
It was a part of the Ottoman Empire from the sixteenth century
until the First World War. After the War, Syria was integrated
into the French mandate in the Middle East. It gained independ-
ence from France in 1946, but its first decades as a sovereign
nation were marred by violence and conflict.116 Following the
1956 Suez Crisis, Syria aligned itself with the communist Soviet
Union in exchange for acquiring military weapons from this su-
per power.117 From 1958–1961, Syria briefly merged with Egypt,
but this union fell apart, resulting in further instability within
Syria.118 In 1967, Syria fought alongside Egypt against Israel in
the Six-Day War, during which Israel captured the entire Golan
Heights.119 Following hostilities with Jordan in 1970, Hafez al-
Assad, the father of the current president Bashar al-Assad, rose
to power and emerged as ruler of Syria.120 Violence and warfare
ensued throughout Hafez al-Assad’s regime. In 1973, Syria
fought against Israel in the so-called Yom Kippur War, during
which Israeli forces pushed further into Syrian territory.121 In
early 1976, Syrian forces entered Lebanon, where they fought
for control against Israel through an extensive use of proxy wars.
Syrian forces remained in Lebanon until 2005.122 In the late
115 See Syria Profile, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-14703856 (last updated Mar. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Syria Profile].
116 Id.
117 Syria: History: Ideology and Foreign Policy to 1990, ENCYC. BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/578856/Syria/278806/Ideology-
and-foreign-policy-to-1990 (last visited Sept. 10, 2014).
118 Syria Profile, supra note 115.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 ABRAHAM RABINOVICH, THE YOM KIPPUR WAR: THE EPIC ENCOUNTER THAT
TRANSFORMED THEMIDDLE EAST 302 (2004).
122 Syria Profile, supra note 115.
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1970s, an Islamic uprising orchestrated by the Muslim Brother-
hood and aimed against the government resulted in further vio-
lence, culminating in the 1982 Hama Massacre, where thou-
sands of Syrians were killed by the Syrian army.123
Hafez al-Assad died in 2000 and was succeeded by his son, Ba-
shar al-Assad, who ran unopposed for the presidential post. Ba-
shar al-Assad’s election initially sparked hope for reform, but his
regime quickly quashed any protest.124 The current crisis began
as part of the Arab spring: a series of peaceful protests took place
in Syria in the spring of 2011, to be brutally quashed by the Syr-
ian army.125 By the summer of 2011, army defectors formed the
Free Syrian Army and began fighting against government
forces. The opposition movement is dominated by Sunnis,
whereas Assad and the governing regime are mostly Alawites.126
According to some reports, close to 200,000 people have been
killed in this bloody conflict, and over 1.7 million Syrians have
fled to the neighboring countries of Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and
Lebanon.127 Recently, the conflict escalated, resulting in the use
of particularly heinous weapons by the Syrian government. In
August 2013, President Assad allegedly used chemical weapons
against Syrian civilians. A team of United Nations inspectors
has confirmed this.128
123 Id.
124 Id. (noting that “[f]ollowing the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000 Syria un-
derwent a brief period of relaxation. Hundreds of political prisoners were re-
leased, but real political freedoms and a shake-up of the state-dominated econ-
omy never materialized”).
125 Id.
126 Kim Sengupta, Syria's Sectarian War Goes International as Foreign Fight-
ers and Arms Pour into Country, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 20, 2012, http://www.in-
dependent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syrias-sectarian-war-goes-interna-
tional-as-foreign-fighters-and-arms-pour-into-country-7216665.html.
127 Matthew Weaver, Syria Crisis: Number of Refugees Tops 1.5 Million, Says
UN, GUARDIAN (May 16, 2003, 12:55 PM), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2013/may/16/syria-crisis-refugees-million-unl; John Heilprin,
UN: Death toll from Syrian Civil War Tops 191,000, USATODAY (Aug. 22, 2014,
6:26 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/08/22/united-na-
tions-syria-death-toll/14429549/ (noting that 191,000 people have been killed
to date in the Syrian war); MIGRATION POLICY CTR., Syrian Refugees: A Snap-
shot of the Crisis—In the Middle East and Europe, http://syrianrefugees.eu/
(noting that Syrian refugees have been fleeing to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan,
and Iraq) (last updated Oct. 2014).
128 Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know, BBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2013, 5:46
AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23927399; see also U.N.
Secretary-General, United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the
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The ongoing crisis situates itself perfectly within the ongoing
situation in Syria, where all constitutional and democratic free-
doms and values have been lacking. While Syria is officially a
constitutional democracy, many constitutionally-protected free-
doms were suspended between 1963 and 2011 under an Emer-
gency Law presumably because of its ongoing conflict with Israel
over Golan Heights.129 Most human rights observers have ex-
pressed serious concern over Syria’s human rights record, call-
ing it one of the worst on the planet.130 The current conflict has
only exacerbated an already volatile situation.
Syrian demographics have additionally fueled the ongoing con-
flict. The majority of Syrians—approximately 74 percent—are
Sunni Arab; President Assad and his government belong to a
minority Alawite group that comprises approximately 13 per-
cent of the population; Christians constitute a 10 percent minor-
ity; other minority groups such as Turks, Kurds, Assyrians, etc.
constitute the remaining portion of the population.131 Christians
have aligned themselves with the ruling Alawites, from whom
they have expected protection from the more radical Islamic
Sunnis. Many Christians, alongside Alawites, hold prominent
posts within Syria.132 Most Christians have thus supported As-
sad throughout the conflict and have argued that if Assad were
Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic: Report on the Alleged
Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013
(Sept. 13, 2013), available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/con-
tent/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf.
129 Decrees on Ending State of Emergency, Abolishing SSSC, Regulating Right
to Peaceful Demonstration, SYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY (April 22, 2011),
http://www.sana-syria.org/eng/361/2011/04/22/pr-342711.htm.
130 Freedom in the World 2011, FREEDOM HOUSE, http://freedomhouse.org/re-
port/freedom-world/freedom-world-2011?page=363&year=2011&coun-
try=8143 (last visited Sept. 13, 2014); see also Human Rights in Syria, HUM.
RTS. WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/middle-eastn-africa/syria (last visited Oct.
19, 2014); Syria, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/coun-
tries/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
131 Syria Demographics Profile 2014, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, http://www.in-
dexmundi.com/syria/demographics_profile.html (last updated Aug. 23, 2014).
132 Stephen Starr, Syria's Christians Continue to Stand by Assad Regime,
GLOBALPOST (Feb. 6, 2002, 7:00 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/dis-
patch/news/regions/middle-east/120205/syria-christians-assad-regime-damas-
cus-russia-china (“Thousands of Christians are tied up in the regime's security
apparatus and are employed in high-ranking government and military posi-
tions.”).
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removed, the dominant Sunnis would install an Islamic, extrem-
ist government, which would harm Christians and all other mi-
nority groups even further.133
In the wake of the horrific violence and bloodshed in Syria and
in particular, following allegations of chemical weapons used by
the Assad regime, the international community has grappled
with the issue of whether to militarily intervene in this volatile
region. The United Nations Security Council has been blocked
over the issue because both Russia and China have threatened
to veto any resolution calling for military action against Syria.134
The United States briefly attempted to build consensus over the
idea of staging a unilateral intervention in Syria, alongside al-
lies such as Great Britain and France.135 In September 2013,
United States Secretary of State, John Kerry, negotiated an
agreement with the Russian Prime Minister, Sergei Lavrov,
whereby Syrian leadership would agree to a chemical weapons
inspection and ultimate destruction regime.136 All veto holders
on the Security Council agreed to the proposed regime, and Res-
olution 2118 was passed by the Security Council on September
27, 2013.137 Resolution 2118 requires first that Syria eliminate
its chemical stockpile and allow complete access for both the
United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons chemical weapons inspectors. It then con-
133 Id. (“As a fellow minority, Christians have long supported the Alawite re-
gime in order to ensure protection and rights for themselves.”).
134 Louis Charbonneau & Michelle Nichols, U.N. Security Council Powers Meet
Again on Syria; No Outcome, REUTERS (Aug. 29, 2013, 5:39 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/29/us-syria-crisis-un-
idUSBRE97S17R20130829 (noting that Russia and China had vetoed three
proposed resolutions that would have condemned the Assad regime and threat-
ened United Nations sanctions).
135 Id. (noting that the United States and Great Britain sought to convince the
public of the need to engage in military strikes against Syria); see also France’s
Hollande Backs US on Syria Action, BBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2013, 12:57 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23897775 (noting that the
French President, Francois Hollande, has backed the United States’ proposal
for military action in Syria).
136 Lynch, supra note 5.
137 Resolution 2118, supra note 4; see also Press Release, Security Council, Se-
curity Council Requires Scheduled Destruction of Syria’s Chemical Weapons,
Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2118, U.N. Press Release SC/11135 (Sept.
27, 2013), http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11135.doc.htm (noting that Res-
olution 2118 was unanimously adopted).
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templates the removal and destruction of Syrian chemical weap-
ons at secure sites.138 If Syria does not comply with the imposed
regime, the Security Council could adopt a second resolution re-
garding imposition of military or other actions against Syria un-
der Chapter VII of the United Nation Charter.139 A violation by
the Assad regime of the inspection regime does not trigger an
automatic military response by the Security Council, but pre-
sumably, Security Council member states would reunite and se-
riously discuss the possibility of authorizing force against Syria
if Assad were to flaunt the inspection regime.
The inspection regime has temporarily removed the issue of
humanitarian intervention from the Security Council’s discus-
sion table. Yet, should the Assad regime choose to disrespect the
mandated inspection regime, the possibility of humanitarian in-
tervention would fervently return to the center of discussion.
Moreover, the inspection regime has only dealt with the issue of
possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian govern-
ment, but it has done nothing to resolve or alleviate humanitar-
ian suffering within Syria. Should Security Council member
states revisit the issue of military intervention in order to halt
such suffering, or if the Assad regime failed to comply with the
inspection regime, it is likely that paralysis would occur once
again and veto-wielding nations such as Russia and China would
block all possibilities of authorizing force in Syria. Thus, nations
like the United States, which had contemplated using military
force in Syria, may have to revisit this option in the near future
in order to fully resolve the ongoing civil war in this explosive
nation.
The section below explores the legality of any use of force
against the Syrian regime exercised by the United States or an-
other state or coalition of states outside of the confines of the
United Nations Charter system.
IV. POTENTIAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE LEGALITY OFUSE OF
FORCE
Scholars and politicians have made numerous arguments as to
why the proposed humanitarian intervention in Syria would be
legal under international law. This Section briefly describes the
138 Id.
139 Id.
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most frequently raised arguments and explains why none of
them offers a solid legal basis for the proposed intervention.
President Obama famously claimed that Syrian President As-
sad crossed a “red line” when he allegedly used chemical weap-
ons against his own civilian population.140 According to Presi-
dent Obama, the crossing of this imaginary line through the use
of prohibited and heinous weaponry against innocent civilians
would serve as justification under international law for a mili-
tary strike against Syria.141 This argument adopts a novel view:
that states may intervene against other states to prevent a hu-
manitarian catastrophe if such other states are using dangerous
weapons. This argument is different from that made in support
of humanitarian intervention. Under the latter view, states are
justified in intervening militarily against states that abuse hu-
man rights to a level causing a humanitarian catastrophe, re-
gardless of which kinds of weapons the abusing state may be us-
ing.142 In other words, it does not matter if the offending regime
is using machetes, as in Rwanda, ground troops, as in Kosovo,
or chemical weapons, as in Syria. The necessity to prevent hu-
manitarian suffering enables all states to intervene, even if the
offending regime did not cross any “red lines.” Many scholars
have already made this argument regarding Syria: that the sit-
uation there has been catastrophic for two years and the use of
chemical weapons to murder civilians is not any different than
the use of traditional weapons toward the same end.143 The le-
gality of President Obama’s argument—that the use of chemical
weapons somehow justifies an otherwise unauthorized military
140 SeeGlenn Kessler, President Obama and the “Red Line” on Syria’s Chemical
Weapons, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2013/09/06/president-obama-and-the-red-
line-on-syrias-chemical-weapons (quoting President Obama’s remarks to re-
porters on August 20, 2012: “We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but
also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a
whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would
change my calculus. That would change my equation.”).
141 For an official explanation of President Obama’s position on Syria, see Ka-
ren Parrish, Obama: Syria Strikes Justified, But Diplomacy May Work,
AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.de-
fense.gov/News/newsarticle.aspx?ID=120752.
142 See supra Part II for a discussion on humanitarian intervention.
143 For a provocative discussion on the use of chemical weapons, see Kevin Jon
Heller, What’s So Terrible About Chemical Weapons?, OPINIOJURIS (Aug. 27,
2013, 6:29 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/08/27/whats-terrible-chemical-
weapons/.
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response by an outside nation, like the United States—is ques-
tionable. Moreover, President Obama’s argument mixes the ra-
tionale for humanitarian intervention with the jus in bello pro-
hibition against the use of chemical weapons.144 The combina-
tion of the two somehow, according to the Obama Administra-
tion, provides legal basis toward a military intervention.145 It is
true that chemical weapons have been prohibited via treaty law
in international armed conflict and that, accordingly, the use of
such prohibited weapons would constitute a violation of jus in
bello.146 However, it is legally incorrect to claim that the use of
144 For a critique of the Obama Administration position, see Kevin Jon Heller,
Obama’s Bizarre New Theory of Customary International Law, OPINIO JURIS
(Sept. 7, 2013, 7:53 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/07/obamas-bizarre-
new-theory-customary-international-law/. The term “jus ad bellum” refers to
“the law governing the resort to force as enshrined in the United Nations Char-
ter.” Laurie R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of
War, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 675, 679 (2012). The term “jus in bello” refers to law
of war, otherwise known as international humanitarian law, which “applies to
situations of armed conflict and governs the conduct of hostilities and the pro-
tection of persons during conflict.” Id. at 681.
145 The U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, offered the following justification
for the use of force against Syria:
What we saw in Syria last week should shock the conscience of the
world. It defies any code of morality. Let me be clear. The indiscrimi-
nate slaughter of civilians, the killing of women and children and in-
nocent bystanders by chemical weapons is a moral obscenity. By any
standard, it is inexcusable. And despite the excuses and equivocations
that some have manufactured, it is undeniable.
Heller, supra note 143. See also Krista Nelson, Syria Insta-Symposium: The
Significance of Chemical Weapons Use Under International Law, OPINIOJURIS
(Sept. 6, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/06/syria-insta-sympo-
sium-significance-chemical-weapons-use-international-law/ (noting that “[t]he
administration suggests that the use of chemical weapons links the Syrian con-
flict to U.S. national security interests”).
146 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stock-
piling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (“Chemical
Weapons Convention”), which entered into force in 1997, prohibits State Par-
ties from using, producing, and transferring chemical weapons. Article 1 pro-
vides as follows:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any cir-
cumstances: (a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or
retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical
weapons to anyone; (b) To use chemical weapons; (c) To engage in any
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chemical weapons is prohibited in internal warfare, such as in
Syria, and that such use of chemical weapons in a civil war pro-
vides a basis for the use of force by an external actor under jus
ad bellum.147 In other words, the use of chemical weapons in
noninternational armed conflict is not a violation of jus in bello
per se, and even if it were, such violations of jus in bello do not
legitimize the use of force for the purposes of jus ad bellum. Pres-
ident Obama’s argument is flawed from an international law
standpoint regardless of how heinous the use of chemical weap-
ons may be.
The extension of the above-mentioned argument, also made by
the Obama administration, is that the alleged use of chemical
weapons by President Assad poses a threat to American national
security and that, accordingly, President Obama can deploy
American troops to Syria without Congressional approval.148
military preparations to use chemical weapons; (d) To assist, encour-
age or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited
to a State Party under this Convention.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. I, Jan. 13, 1993,
1974 U.N.T.S. 45, 32 I.L.M. 800. One of the four core principles of jus in bello
is the principle of humanity, otherwise known as the principle of unnecessary
suffering; this principle’s purpose is to minimize suffering during armed con-
flict. Thus, “weapons that by their nature cause unnecessary suffering are out-
lawed.” Blank, supra note 144, at 682–83; see also Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Vic-
tims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 35(2), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3. It follows that using prohibited weapons, such as chemical weap-
ons, which have been outlawed in international armed conflict, is a violation of
the principle of humanity and thus a violation of jus in bello. For a history of
the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, see Genesis and Histor-
ical Development, ORG. FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/genesis-and-historical-de-
velopment/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
147 Most scholars would agree that treaty law does not prohibit the use of chem-
ical weapons in noninternational armed conflict; many would also agree that
customary international law does not provide a clear ban on the use of chemical
weapons in noninternational armed conflict. See Jillian Blake & Aqsa
Mahmud, A Legal ‘Red Line’?: Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons in Civil
Conflict, 61UCLAL. REV. DISCOURSE 244, 255–57 (2013) (noting that while the
International Committee on the Red Cross has adopted the view that the use
of chemical weapons is banned under both international and noninternational
armed conflict, customary international law does not provide such a consistent
norm or ban when it comes to the latter type of conflict).
148 Parrish, supra note 141.
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While this argument may or may not be correct, it poses a con-
stitutional law question of when our President may use force
without proper authorization by Congress.149 In fact, the Presi-
dent, as Commander-in-Chief, has the inherent constitutional
authority to use force without Congressional approval when
there is a threat to the United States’ national security.150 In the
case of Syria, President Obama, unwilling initially to seek Con-
gressional authorization to use force abroad, claimed that be-
cause the Syrian situation posed a threat to American national
security, he could decide in his sole presidential authority to use
149 Much has been written on this difficult legal issue. For example, Michael
Dorf wrote that:
Because the Constitution allocates some military powers to Congress
and others to the President, the line between what the President can
do on his own, and what he can do only with Congressional authoriza-
tion is often murky. Nonetheless, a general principle emerges that
permits the President to act when delay would be risky. When the
United States faces an actual or imminent attack, the President may
respond with force without first waiting for Congressional authoriza-
tion.
Michael C. Dorf, Could the President Bomb Syria Even If Congress Says No?,
VERDICT (Sept. 9, 2013), http://verdict.justia.com/2013/09/09/could-the-presi-
dent-bomb-syria-even-if-congress-says-no#sthash.Jt0eYU3Z.dpuf; see also Jon
Greenberg, Joe Lieberman Says Obama "Had the Legal Authority" to Strike
Syria Without Congressional Approval, POLITIFACT.COM (Sept. 10, 2013, 4:09
PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2013/sep/12/joe-
lieberman/joe-lieberman-says-obama-had-legal-authority-strik/ (discussing
the President’s constitutional authority to act as commander-in-chief and to
commit forces for the purposes of limited military strikes without Congres-
sional approval and noting that “the president has the authority to use force
on his own when it comes to limited military strikes” and that “[t]here is ample
precedent under many presidents to support that view.”); Geoffrey Corn, Syria
Insta-Symposium: Geoff Corn—The President, Congress, Syria: What If?,
OPINIOJURIS (Sept. 7, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/07/syria-
insta-symposium-geoff-corn-president-congress-syria/. Corn argues specifi-
cally, that had President Obama used force in Syria without seeking Congres-
sional approval first,
he would have been on relatively solid constitutional turf. Invoking
Justice Jackson’s seminal Youngstown methodology for assessing the
legality of exercises of executive power in relation to national security
objectives, the absence of express congressional opposition following
his overt assertion of inherent power and intent to initiate the attack
would indicate congressional acquiescence at worst.
Id.
150 Corn, supra note 149.
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force against the Assad regime.151 The constitutional law ques-
tion of whether President Obama was correct in his assessment
of presidential powers and when and whether those authorize
the President to use force without Congressional approval is a
complex and intriguing one. However, this complex question
goes beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on interna-
tional law issues. Additionally, even if President Assad’s ac-
tions—in using chemical weapons in Syria—did pose a national
security threat to the United States, an American use of force
against Syria would be legal domestically, but would potentially
remain illegal internationally because of international law’s re-
luctance in embracing humanitarian intervention as a new
norm.
The second argument advanced to justify the use of force in
Syria is that of self-defense. According to this argument, the use
of chemical weapons by President Assad poses a threat to other
nations, and powerful states like the United States, Great Brit-
ain, or France may intervene to collectively self-defend every-
body threatened. 152 While self-defense and collective self-de-
fense constitute valid exceptions to the general ban on the use of
force, it is questionable whether nations located thousands of
miles away from Syria may properly claim that Assad’s actions
are a threat rising to the level that would authorize the use of
force in self-defense. Under the traditional view of self-defense,
as announced by the International Court of Justice in the well-
known Nicaragua case, “the exercise of this right is subject to
the State concerned having been the victim of an armed at-
tack.”153 The Syrian situation clearly does not satisfy the criteria
of traditional self-defense because no other state has been a vic-
tim of an armed attack by the Assad regime. Thus, the paradigm
of collective self-defense is inapplicable in the Syrian situation.
151 See Howard Fineman, John Kerry: Obama Can Bomb Assad Even If Con-
gress Votes No, HUFFINGTONPOST (Sept. 6, 2013, 3:10 PM), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/2013/09/06/john-kerry-congress-syria_n_3881200.html.
152 For an elaboration of this argument, see for example, Jordan Paust,US Use
of Limited Force in Syria Can Be Lawful Under the UN Charter, JURIST (Sept.
10, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://jurist.org/forum/2013/09/jordan-paust-force-
syria.php.
153 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27).
148 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:1
Moreover, the Syrian case does not fulfill the criteria of the
more novel self-defense theories, such as anticipatory or preemp-
tive self-defense.154 The Syrian situation does not satisfy the cri-
teria of anticipatory self-defense because powerful states that
have been the major proponents of intervention in Syria cannot
claim that Assad’s actions constitute a threat toward them. It
appears that Assad has been targeting his own population and
mainly, opponents of his regime.155 It does not seem that Assad
has made any threats against any other nations. If Assad had
threatened other states, like Israel or Lebanon, and if such other
states invited the United States or other Great Powers to help
them in combatting Assad, then such military action could con-
stitute a valid case of collective self-defense exercised in an an-
ticipatory fashion.156 For similar reasons, the Syrian case does
not fulfill the criteria of preemptive self-defense because no state
can claim that Assad’s actions will post a future threat toward
them or their allies. Under its current regime, self-defense does
not apply to situations where a state wishes to help the popula-
tion of another state that is being abused by that other state.
This situation can only fall under the above-mentioned para-
digm of humanitarian intervention. Self-defense is not a valid
legal argument regarding the proposed intervention in Syria.
The third argument that has been advanced centers around a
specific interpretation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Char-
ter. As discussed above, this Article prohibits the use of force
154 See supra Part I.C for a discussion of anticipatory and preemptive self-de-
fense.
155 See supra Part III for a discussion of the Syrian situation.
156 The ICJ has confirmed that the attacked state must invite other states to
exercise collective self-defense on its behalf: “There is no rule in customary in-
ternational law permitting another State to exercise the right of collective self-
defense on the basis of its own assessment of the situation. Where collective
self-defense is invoked, it is to be expected that the State for whose benefit this
right is used will have declared itself to be the victim of an armed attack.”
Military and Paramilitary Activities, in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27). Anticipatory self-defense is the use of force “by
a state to repel an attacker before an actual attack has taken place, before the
army of the enemy has crossed its border, and before the bombs of the enemy
fall upon its territory.” Leo Van den hole, Anticipatory Self-Defence Under In-
ternational Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 69, 72 (2003). It thus follows that
states may exercise collective self-defense in anticipatory fashion, and that
states threatened by the Assad regime could choose to invite a larger state, like
the United States, to engage in collective self-defense in an anticipatory man-
ner, to prevent the Assad regime from striking first.
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against the “territorial integrity” and “political independence” of
any state.157 According to this argument, the proposed interven-
tion in Syria would not undermine Syrian territorial integrity or
political independence; instead, the intervention would simply
aim to protect civilians and halt humanitarian suffering. 158
Moreover, this argument asserts that the United Nations Char-
ter should be interpreted more broadly, in light of the Charter’s
purposes and goals.
In the special context of an ongoing belligerency in Syria and
significant outside recognition of the Syrian National Council
(SNC) as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, a
limited use of force by the US against the Assad regime's mili-
tary capabilities in response to a criminal use of chemical
weapons would not simplistically be against the territorial in-
tegrity of Syria or the political independence of the Syrian peo-
ple. On balance, it would be consistent with major purposes of
the Charter, such as the need to serve peace, security, self-de-
termination of people, and human rights.159
Proponents of this argument claim that the Charter does not
ban all uses of force and that those uses of force that serve the
goal of preventing humanitarian suffering are fully consistent
with the broader purposes of the Charter, such as preserving
peace, security, and protecting self-determination.160 It is dubi-
ous whether this argument is legally sound. Any time military
force is used against a state, such use of force constitutes an en-
croachment of the state’s sovereignty. Sovereignty inherently
implies territorial integrity—the notion that a state is free of in-
tervention by any external actors.161 Thus, any use of force for
whatever purpose against a state is a violation of that state’s
sovereignty. Similarly, any use of force against a state will un-
doubtedly undermine its political regime and leadership; thus,
use of force inherently threatens a state’s political independence.
Finally, while a broad interpretation of the Charter that takes
into account its purposes may be embraced at some point in the
157 U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
158 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 152.
159 Id.
160 See, e.g., Id.
161 As Louis Henkin famously argued, states which negotiated the United Na-
tions Charter agreed to forgo the use for force but were in turn assured “the
enjoyment of their territory, their freedom—a kind of right to be left alone.”
HENKIN, supra note 15, at 137.
150 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:1
future, under existing international law, the Charter has never
been interpreted in this manner.162
The last argument that has been made is that a regional mili-
tary action against Syria may constitute a valid use of force, de-
spite the lack of Security Council authorization. Proponents of
this argument cite the Kosovo precedent, a situation where
NATO countries assembled their forces to launch a military of-
fensive against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia leadership,
without Security Council involvement or approval.163 Moreover,
those advancing this argument cite the use of force in the Cuban
Missile Crisis, pursuant to a resolution by the Organization of
American States and without Security Council approval, as an-
other historical example of a legally valid use of force through a
regional organization approval. 164 This argument is legally
flawed: most academics, politicians, and other actors have la-
beled Kosovo as legitimate but illegal.165 Moreover, most inter-
national law experts would not cite the Cuban Missile Crisis as
a valid exception to the firmly settled rules on the use of force
under the United Nations Charter.166 While the Organization of
162 The ICJ has confirmed the “traditional” interpretation of the United Na-
tions Charter as banning all uses of force other than those in self-defense in
the Nicaragua v. United States case and the Nuclear Weapons advisory opin-
ion. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶
195 (June 27); see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ad-
visory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
163 For a discussion on Kosovo and the role of NATO, see Nicola Butler, NATO:
From Collective Defence to Peace Enforcement, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE
OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: SELECTIVE INDIGNATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION,
AND INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 26, at 273–90.
164 See Paust, supra note 152.
If NATO or the League of Arab States authorizes the use of force, Ar-
ticle 52 of the Charter would allow the use of "regional action" for the
"maintenance of regional peace and security" when the Security Coun-
cil is veto-deadlocked and is unable to control "enforcement action"
under Article 53, as in the case of Kosovo under an authorization from
NATO and during the Cuban Missile Crisis under an authorization
from the OAS.
Id. For a full discussion of the Cuban missile crisis, see Marjorie M. Whiteman,
4 DIG. INT’L L. 501, 523–24 (1965).
165 See supra Parts I.C and II.A for a discussion of the Kosovo case.
166 See, e.g., Matthew C. Waxman, What the Cuban Missile Crisis Teaches Us
About Iran, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Oct. 25, 2012),
http://www.cfr.org/iran/cuban-missile-crisis-teaches-us-iran/p29357 (noting
that the United States decided to base its decision to launch a quarantine on
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American States resolution may have provided legitimacy to-
ward the use of force against Cuba in this case, an isolated res-
olution by one of many regional organizations does not suffice to
alter existing international law norms. The United Nations
Charter does not contemplate any regional military action ab-
sent Security Council approval. The existence of regional mini-
security councils was not envisioned by the Charter drafters,
and while the existence of regional organizations and the work
thereof is laudable, any use of military force by such bodies, ab-
sent a scenario of collective self-defense, would be illegal under
international law.
The Syrian case illustrates the difficulty of applying any exist-
ing norms on the use of force to a situation of internal warfare
coupled with a deadlocked Security Council, where nations able
and willing to intervene toward resolving the humanitarian ca-
tastrophe may be legally and formally prevented from doing so.
Part V below proposes and discusses a new framework for the
legality of humanitarian intervention in a situation like Syria;
such a new framework would attempt to advance novel rules of
international law that may be helpful in addressing future situ-
ations of humanitarian suffering.
V. BETTER ANSWER: PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR LEGALITY
Any unilateral military action against Syria exercised without
Security Council approval constitutes a use of force that can be
best justified through the paradigm of humanitarian interven-
tion: this concept is an emerging norm of customary law that
could develop into binding law in the near future. The creation
of any norm of customary law requires two elements: opinio juris
and state practice.167 The former refers to a conclusion that
states are performing certain acts out of a sense of legal obliga-
tion, whereas the latter requires a finding of continuous and
widespread state action.168 State action and practice aimed at
creating a new norm of customary law may in fact break an ex-
isting norm. In other words, states may have to engage in behav-
ior that purposely violates existing rules in order to create new,
Cuba in the Cuban Missile Crisis on a Resolution by the Organization of Amer-
ican States, but that this was at best “a very weak legal argument (since the
OAS could not authorize a use of force that was prohibited by the U.N. Char-
ter)” and that the American legal argument was “so thin”).
167 DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 38, at 59.
168 Id.
152 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:1
presumably better rules. For the purposes of Syria, this implies
that states may have to engage in military intervention without
Security Council approval, and for a humanitarian purpose,
thereby breaking the existing ban on the use of force, in order to
establish a new customary norm of humanitarian intervention.
States have, in the past, engaged in this type of law-challenging
behavior. For example, states have supported self-determina-
tion-seeking groups outside of the decolonization context, poten-
tially violating the existing norm of territorial integrity and uti
possidetis, in order to create a new norm and new right of self-
determination open to all peoples.169 In the wake of 9/11, states
have advanced a somewhat novel argument that force can be
used in self-defense against nonstate actors. 170 In addition,
states have attempted to alter the traditional notion of self-de-
fense by advancing arguments such as anticipatory or preemp-
tive self-defense.171 Breaking the existing ban on the use of
force, absent a self-defense scenario or Security Council ap-
proval, may constitute another instance of law-breaking and
law-making behavior by powerful states if they chose to inter-
vene in Syria for humanitarian purposes. The part below exam-
ines Harold Koh’s proposed normative framework for humani-
tarian intervention and critically assesses the strengths of the
proposal while suggesting minor additions and modifications.
Finally, this part proposes a reconstructed legal framework for
the legality of humanitarian intervention.
A. Koh’s Proposed Framework for Humanitarian Intervention
In the context of Syria, the argument in favor of humanitarian
intervention is solid. In the words of Harold Koh, “Syria is a law-
making moment” because all the conditions seem to be met for
the advancement of a novel legal argument: that humanitarian
intervention should crystallize into a new binding norm of inter-
national law.172 According to Koh, humanitarian intervention
169 For a discussion of states’ support for various self-determination-seeking
groups, see, for example, STERIO, supra note 47, at 57–70 (discussing the Great
Powers’ role in supporting or not supporting various self-determination-seek-
ing groups).
170 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
171 See supra Part II for a discussion of self-defense rules under international
law.
172 Koh, Part II, supra note 7.
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could be legal under international law if the following conditions
were met:
[1] If a humanitarian crisis creates consequences significantly
disruptive of international order—including proliferation of
chemical weapons, massive refugee outflows, and events desta-
bilizing to regional peace and security of the region—that
would likely soon create an imminent threat to the acting na-
tions (which would give rise to an urgent need to act in individ-
ual and collective self-defense under Article 51);
[2] a Security Council resolution was not available because of
persistent veto; and the group of nations that had persistently
sought Security Council action had exhausted all other reme-
dies reasonably available under the circumstances, they would
not violate U.N. Charter Article 2(4) if they used
[3] limited force for genuinely humanitarian purposes that was
necessary and proportionate to address the imminent threat,
would demonstrably improve the humanitarian situation, and
would terminate as soon as the threat is abated.173
Over the past few decades, humanitarian intervention has
grown from a hawkish argument advanced by a few in the inter-
national community to a powerfully emerging norm of custom-
ary law. Evidence to support the emergence of this norm cannot
be ignored; moreover, the emergence of such a norm is a neces-
sity in the type of warfare today, where conflict is more often
intra-state than inter-state and where civilians represent tar-
gets more frequently than soldiers.
First, both opinio juris and state practice have slowly been
turning toward approval of humanitarian intervention as a new
norm of customary law. In the context of Kosovo, in 1999, many
states were ready and willing to participate in a NATO-led mil-
itary intervention, outside of the confines of the United Nations
Charter.174 While some states, like the United States, attempted
173 Id.
174 A total of thirteen states participated in the so-called Operation Allied
Force, through which air strikes were carried out on the territory of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. These states included Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States. See Operation Allied Force, ALLIED
JOINT FORCE COMMAND NAPLES, http://www.jfc-
naples.nato.int/page7196179.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2014). The 1999
NATO-led air strikes functioned outside of the confines of the United Nations
Charter because they were not authorized by the Security Council, and because
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to paint this intervention as sui generis and not precedent-cre-
ating, others more openly admitted to their belief that this type
of action was indeed justified under international law.175 More-
over, even states that denied that Kosovo was any type of a new
precedent-setting norm nonetheless participated in this military
intervention.176 State practice in the case of Kosovo points to the
emergence of a new norm of customary law, namely, humanitar-
ian intervention. As the Independent International Commission
on Kosovo pointed out, “[t]he Kosovo ‘exception’ now exists, for
better and worse, as a contested precedent that must be assessed
in relation to a wide range of international effects and undertak-
ings.”177 In addition, in the aftermath of Kosovo, the then United
Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, has stated that he be-
lieved “[e]merging slowly . . . [was] an international norm
against the violent repression of minorities that [would] and
must take precedence over concerns of state sovereignty.”178
Other examples of humanitarian intervention over the course of
the last two decades include a 1991 intervention on behalf of the
Kurds sanctioned by the United Nations and exercised against
Iraq as well as the 2011 military intervention in Libya.179 In ad-
no particular NATO country could claim self-defense against the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia. See, e.g., AdamRoberts,NATO’s ‘HumanitarianWar’ over
Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL, no. 3, at 103–04 (Autumn 1999) (noting that the NATO
intervention had not been approved by the Security Council).
175 See Murphy, supra note 57; Duke, supra note 57 (discussing the United
States’ position that Kosovo was sui generis and the United Kingdom govern-
ment’s position that the Kosovo intervention was legal under international
law).
176 A prime example of this would be the United States—the main proponent
of the NATO-led intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and a state
that refused to acknowledge that the Kosovo intervention could set any type of
precedent in international law. See Ian Bancroft, After Kosovo, the Deluge,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2008, 7:30 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentis-
free/2008/mar/17/afterkosovothedeluge (observing that “the US secretary of
state, Condoleezza Rice, insists that Kosovo constitutes a sui generis case due
to the nature of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and its associated wars”).
177 KOSOVO COMM’N, supra note 56, at 175.
178 See Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, Address to the Fifty-Fifth Session
of the Commission on Human Rights (Apr. 8, 1999),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=804
7&LangID=E [hereinafter Geneva Address].
179 Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti—
Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International
Law—Part I, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305, 330–34 (1992) (discussing the
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dition to such examples of humanitarian intervention, the inter-
national community has grappled with this issue, and many
states have indicated their willingness to develop a new norm
authorizing military action against rogue regimes.180 Many such
discussions have already occurred within the context of Respon-
sibility to Protect.181 While the existing document on Responsi-
bility to Protect places any military intervention within the pur-
view of the Security Council, many states’ willingness to debate
this issue and question the Security Council’s monopoly in this
area demonstrates an emergence of a new way of thinking.182
Additionally, the theory of involuntary sovereignty waiver pro-
vides another example of progressive thought in proposing that
humanitarian intervention be accepted as a sovereignty-break-
ing model of military action, where rogue regimes choose to dis-
respect their own sovereignty privileges under international
law. Finally, humanitarian intervention has been present in the
1991 intervention on behalf of the Kurds). While military intervention in Libya
had been authorized through Security Council Resolution 1973, the action it-
self was exercised by a coalition of nineteen states and involvement by NATO.
Although Libya does not represent an instance of humanitarian intervention
absent Security Council authorization, it does illustrate the willingness of mul-
tiple states to participate in a military intervention to protect civilians from
humanitarian suffering. See, e.g., Qatar, Several EU States up for Libya Action:
Diplomat, EUBUSINESS (Mar. 19, 2011, 6:45 PM), http://www.eubusi-
ness.com/news-eu/libya-unrest-summit.95v/; see also Libya Example Shows
UN Resolution on Syria Might Be Used to Justify Broad Intervention, RT.COM
(Sept. 24, 2013), http://rt.com/op-edge/libya-un-broad-intervention-277/ (not-
ing that Resolution 1973 “was presented as a humanitarian resolution”).
180 For example, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo wrote
that it would be beneficial to “conceive of an emergent doctrine of humanitar-
ian intervention.” See KOSOVO COMM’N, supra note 56, at 187.
181 For a full discussion of Responsibility to Protect, see supra Part II.B.
182 In fact, some have argued that the Security Council has a moral and ethical
duty to act in situations involving a humanitarian crisis. Kofi Annan argued
the following in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis:
When civilians are attacked and massacred because of their ethnicity,
as in Kosovo, the world looks to the United Nations to speak up for
them. . . . If, in the face of such abuses, we do not speak up and speak
out, if we do not act in defense of human rights and advocate their
lasting universality, how can we answer to that global constituency? .
. . We will not and we cannot accept a situation where people are bru-
talized within national boundaries. . . . [A] United Nations that will
not stand up for human rights is a United Nations that cannot stand
up for itself.
Geneva Address, supra note 178.
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public discussions of many states and on the agenda of the
United Nations General Assembly.183 The absence of consensus
on this issue does not demonstrate that states do not wish to
develop a new normative framework for humanitarian interven-
tion; to the contrary, such lack of consensus indicates that states
take this issue very seriously and may be in the process of coop-
erating toward the development of a new norm.
Second, modern-day warfare necessitates the development of
a new norm authorizing military intervention in situations
where the Security Council is deadlocked and where humanitar-
ian suffering becomes intolerable. Most recent wars have been
internal and have involved large civilian populations.184 Unfor-
tunately, Security Council politics have resulted in multiple ve-
toes, and only a small number of military actions have ever been
authorized.185 Civilian populations need the international com-
munity’s protection, and such protection can only be offered if a
normative framework for true humanitarian intervention is de-
veloped. Syria may be the perfect opportunity to do so. The
framework proposed by Harold Koh in the context of Syria ac-
complishes the important task of legalizing humanitarian inter-
vention under very strict, limited circumstances. The section be-
low will critically appraise Koh’s proposed framework while also
developing additional criteria for legalizing humanitarian inter-
vention.
B. A Critical Assessment of Koh’s Proposed Framework
Koh’s framework first requires the existence of a humanitar-
ian crisis of a significant proportion.186 Thus, intervention would
not be allowed for relatively minor conflicts and would only be
condoned in the most serious situations. This requirement would
183 See supra Part II.A for a discussion of humanitarian intervention and supra
Part II.B for a discussion of Responsibility to Protect. The latter reflects the
United Nations’, as well as its member states’ willingness to discuss sover-
eignty-encroaching intervention, in order to protect populations from humani-
tarian suffering.
184 See e.g., Mayall, supra note 71, at 320 (noting that since the Gulf War, the
majority of conflict that the United Nations was involved in were intrastate
conflicts, necessitating Chapter VI intervention to provide humanitarian relief
as well as peacekeeping functions).
185 Security Council has authorized the use of force only a handful of times
since its inception. See supra Part I.B, notes 34–37 and the accompanying dis-
cussion.
186 Koh, Part II, supra note 7.
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prevent states from staging frequent incursions into strategic
areas to remove unfriendly political leaders or achieve other
kinds of self-interested goals under the pretext of humanitarian
intervention. The intervening state would have the burden of
proving the magnitude of humanitarian suffering in order to jus-
tify its military involvement.
Second, Koh’s framework calls for the existence of additional
aggravating factors, such as the use of chemical weapons, the
development of a refugee crisis, or the potential to destabilize
regional peace and security, which would threaten acting na-
tions.187 The requirement of a threat to acting nations brings hu-
manitarian intervention closer to a self-defense paradigm. The
idea here is that the intervenor must have some link to the crisis
and must demonstrate that the crisis is somehow hampering its
own interests. This Article disagrees with Koh on this point. A
true humanitarian intervention is distinct from self-defense,
and arguably a nation that has a valid self-defense argument
does not need to engage in a humanitarian intervention-type ra-
tionale in order to justify its use of force against another state.
Humanitarian intervention is necessary precisely in those situ-
ations where the self-defense paradigm is inapplicable, like in
Syria, Rwanda, or Kosovo. It is true that in some of these situa-
tions, neighboring and regional states could have made a self-
defense argument and could have invited larger states, like the
United States, to assist them by engaging in collective self-de-
fense. However, in many instances, the collective self-defense ar-
gument is too tenuous either because the regional state is not
really threatened by the rogue state or because the regional
state has not explicitly “invited” the large external state to do
anything. In such situations, developing a consistent legal
framework for humanitarian intervention, without the existence
of self-defense circumstances, is a preferable and more legally
sound approach.
Third, Koh’s framework calls for the Security Council’s in-
volvement by requiring that this organ be consulted first and
that the intervenor nation attempt to secure a Security Council
resolution prior to staging a unilateral intervention.188 This sys-
tem preserves the Security Council monopoly over use of force
issues by engaging it first and giving it the opportunity to put
187 Id.
188 Id.
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together a United Nations-led coalition in order to rectify a hu-
manitarian crisis. Under this requirement, the intervenor na-
tion must also exhaust all other remedies before resorting to a
unilateral use of force; under this view, the use of force is a last
resort, an option available only if all others have been utilized
and if all other approaches are futile. This is an important re-
quirement because it may prevent states from staging military
action under the guise of a faux humanitarian intervention. In
other words, because states must first involve the Security
Council and ask it to act, they may feel embarrassed and become
unwilling to present bogus requests for humanitarian interven-
tion. This approach thus preserves the important role of the Se-
curity Council, ensures that it will not be bypassed, stifles po-
tential, illegitimate requests for the use of force, and preserves
unilateral humanitarian intervention as a limited last resort.
Fourth, Koh’s proposal specifies that any force used against a
state must be “limited” and “for genuinely humanitarian pur-
poses,” as well as that it must be necessary and proportionate in
relation to any imminent threat.189 This is an important require-
ment as well—Koh does not suggest that force used for humani-
tarian purposes may be of any kind. To illustrate this point, con-
sider the following scenario. Let’s assume that Syria had only
used traditional weapons against its civilian population, but the
humanitarian suffering caused thereby reached the level war-
ranting an outside response and all the other requirements for
humanitarian intervention, as delineated in Koh’s proposal,
were satisfied. The intervening state could then lawfully engage
in humanitarian intervention against the Syrian regime, but
could not use nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear weapons in
such a scenario would not be necessary or proportionate relative
to the threat posed by the Syrian regime. Similarly, any force
used under this framework must be limited to preventing hu-
manitarian suffering and only used toward that purpose. If hu-
manitarian suffering could be halted without removing Assad as
president of Syria, then presumably under this framework, the
goal of a humanitarian intervention could not be the removal of
the current leadership and instead, it would have to focus on
simply halting the abuses. Any other use of force would no longer
be limited and would not be used strictly for humanitarian pur-
poses.
189 Id.
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Finally, Koh’s proposed framework calls for a political and mil-
itary appraisal: any humanitarian intervention should strive to-
ward improving the humanitarian situation and should termi-
nate as soon as the humanitarian crisis is resolved.190 The bur-
den here would be on the intervening state or states to deter-
mine the exact scope and goal of a staged humanitarian inter-
vention as well as to ensure that the action is truly helping mat-
ters on the ground. Thus, in the context of Syria, any humani-
tarian action would have to focus on alleviating humanitarian
suffering and would have to end when this goal is achieved. The
requirement for this kind of a calculus would seemingly prevent
states from simply launching aerial attacks to neutralize the po-
litical leadership of a state if such action would not ease human-
itarian suffering. This requirement would also obligate interven-
ing states to terminate their involvement in an area as soon as
the imminent crisis is resolved. Thus, prolonged political or mil-
itary involvement in a strategic area could not be justified under
this proposed framework for humanitarian intervention.
Koh concludes that if this framework is respected, the inter-
vening state would not violate Article 2(4) and its ban on the use
of force. I disagree with Koh, but also applaud his argument. In-
ternational law currently bans any use of force except in self-
defense or with Security Council approval.191 Thus, force used to
stage a unilateral humanitarian intervention would violate Ar-
ticle 2(4). Koh is wrong in his conclusion that the use of force
under his proposed framework for humanitarian intervention
would not violate the United Nations Charter. Nevertheless,
Koh is correct in developing and advancing this argument. Cus-
tomary norms of law emerge through novel legal arguments and
through states’ acceptance and usage of such arguments. The
only way that humanitarian intervention can develop into a
binding norm of customary law is through the writing of schol-
ars, like Koh, which can then be espoused by political leaders
and put into frequent use. Where I also agree with Koh is that
humanitarian intervention is a necessity in today’s world—mod-
ern-day conflicts often remain within a single state’s boundary
and cause tremendous humanitarian suffering. Because the Se-
190 Id.
191 See supra Part I for a discussion of the current international law norms on
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curity Council often remains deadlocked over geo-political inter-
ests of its permanent members, it is essential that the interna-
tional community become enabled to act without its explicit ap-
proval. The hope here is that humanitarian intervention can
eventually morph from an emerging norm of international law
into a binding one; that customary law will evolve and embrace
this new norm; that the Security Council’s structure of veto
power can be overcome through such development of binding
custom.
The emergence of a new customary norm of international law
is a difficult proposition. How does one “prove” that customary
law contains a new norm? How does one demonstrate the exact
content of that norm? To quote Koh, it would be “a failure of law-
yerly responsibility, which we would not accept in other legal
situations,” not to attempt to delineate the content of the new
humanitarian intervention exception to the overall ban on the
use of force.192 Academics, politicians, judges, and arbitrators
have already grappled with the idea of proving the existence and
content of a customary law norm. They have looked to the tradi-
tional sources of international law: treaties, writings of scholars,
judicial opinions, and general principles of law. They have re-
viewed United Nations sources, such as Security Council and
General Assembly resolutions, soft law instruments, such as
codes of conduct, guidelines, gentlemen’s agreements, and vari-
ous political statements. They have browsed through supporting
and interpretative documents, such as travaux preparatoires,
legislative history behind national statutes, and drafting history
and drafters’ statements linked to any international document.
Anyone looking for the emergence of a new customary norm of
humanitarian intervention would look in similar places. It is
thus important that the proposed framework for the legality of
humanitarian intervention becomes a part of the international
legal discourse—that it continues to be discussed at academic
forums and conferences, remains a subject of controversy on the
Security Council and General Assembly agenda, and persists to
occupy a sore subject of political and diplomatic negotiation. The
development of any new legal rule requires tenacity and persis-
tence. Developing a legal framework for humanitarian interven-
tion will similarly require significant effort; it is too important
of a task however to justify giving up.
192 Koh, Part II, supra note 7.
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Koh’s proposed framework has not been received without crit-
icism. Many have both criticized Koh and pointed to various
weaknesses of his proposed framework. Professor David Kaye
has argued that Koh’s interpretation of Article 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter is incorrect because the protection of human
rights cannot take precedence over the ban on the use of force.193
“The ban on force forms part of the deep structure of the Charter
and one of the core motivating premises of the United Na-
tions.”194 In addition, Professor Kaye believes that the United
Nations Charter only allows for one exception to the overall ban
on the use of force, outside of the paradigm of a Security Council-
approved intervention, which is self-defense.195 Finally, Profes-
sor Kaye does not believe that the Kosovo intervention provides
an appropriate instance of state practice embracing humanitar-
ian intervention because of the State Department’s refusal to
bless the legality of the intervention.196 Ultimately, Professor
Kaye believes that instead of developing a normative framework
for humanitarian intervention in general, it is a better approach
if policy makers weigh specific considerations and factors for
each situation, like Kosovo or Syria, against the existing norm
banning the use of force.197 Professor Carsten Stahn has argued
that international law contains choices other than doing nothing
over the Syrian crisis or using force, such as “accountability, de-
terrence or sanctioning of jus in bello violations, i.e. preventive
diplomacy, lawful countermeasures, international criminal jus-
tice, sanctions etc.”198 Moreover, Professor Stahn has questioned
whether the proposed intervention in Syria falls within the par-
adigm of humanitarian intervention, where force is used to pre-
vent humanitarian suffering, as opposed to a situation where
force is used to remove a military regime (Assad) or sanction the
193 David Kaye, Harold Koh’s Case for Humanitarian Intervention, JUST
SECURITY (Oct. 7, 2013 1:45 PM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/07/kaye-kohs-
case/.
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198 Carsten Stahn,On ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, ‘Lawmaking’Moments and
What the ‘Law Ought to Be’—Counseling Caution Against a New ‘Affirmative
Defense to Art. 2 (4)’ After Syria, OPINIOJURIS (Oct. 8, 2013, 4:03 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/08/guest-post-humanitarian-intervention-law-
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use of prohibited weapons.199 Professor Stahn has also ques-
tioned the existence of firm rules in customary law authorizing
humanitarian intervention as well as whether it would not be
more beneficial to turn Syria into a law-making moment by en-
gaging the Security Council and other bodies in the development
of new norms on the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons,
on “instruments of prevention, fact-finding and verification,”
and on Responsibility to Protect rather than to conceive of Syria
as a law-breaking moment, where nations are encouraged to
break the ban on the use of force.200 Finally, Kevin Jon Heller
has argued that unilateral humanitarian intervention (“UHI”) is
illegal under international law.201
[I]t is impossible to maintain that UHI is a slowly crystallizing
norm of customary international law—much less that, as some
(but not Koh) have argued, customary international law al-
ready accepts it. International law has for too long dismissed
the voices of the Global South; we cannot let the West silence
it concerning UHI. After all, the states of the Global South are
“specially affected” by UHI—it is their territorial sovereignty
and their political independence that UHI threatens, not the
West’s. UHI will never be used against a Western state.202
Koh’s proposed framework already addresses many of the con-
cerns and criticisms that have been raised. First, Koh’s proposed
framework is detailed and well-constructed, but it requires any
intervenor state to engage in a careful political and military cal-
culus, as well as involve the United Nations, before it can legally
claim that it is using force under the umbrella of humanitarian
intervention. As analyzed above, this will appropriately involve
policy-makers in the process of determining whether to use force
in a given instance and whether a situation falls within the par-
adigm of humanitarian intervention, and it will hopefully pre-
vent states from attempting to misuse the framework in order to
justify pure military aggression. Additionally, under the pro-
posed framework, states will have to carefully weigh and con-
sider all nonmilitary options before resorting to the use of force.
199 Id.
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Second, any law can be potentially misused, misinterpreted, or
wrongly applied.203 Humanitarian intervention can be a slip-
pery slope—states may attempt to misuse this rationale to jus-
tify aggressive military action and the use of force for selfish,
national interests under the guise of humanitarian assis-
tance.204 This is not an argument in favor of doing nothing. At
best, it is an argument in favor of adding to Koh’s proposed
framework, thereby turning Syria into both a law-breaking and
law-making moment. One such addition may be a requirement
that any state engaged in a unilateral humanitarian interven-
tion report back to the Security Council. Such a reporting mech-
anism already exists within the U.N. Charter for the exercise of
self-defense;205 it would be equally valid for the humanitarian
intervention paradigm. Another addition may be a requirement
that a state considering the use of force for humanitarian pur-
poses attempt to build an international coalition. Although the
203 Id. (noting that “most norms of international law can be abused” and argu-
ing that such norms do not cease to exist just because they may be abused). On
states’ compliance and lack of compliance with international law, see, for ex-
ample, Harold Hongju Koh,Why Do Nations Obey International Law? (Yale L.
Sch., Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 2101, 1997); see also LOUIS HENKIN,
HOWNATIONSBEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
204 Scholars have already pointed out the lack of a normative framework for
humanitarian intervention. For example, Amos Guiora has argued as follows:
“Humanitarian intervention is an inherently complicated proposition, because
it clearly implies both that nation state ‘A’ is engaged in significant violations
of the human rights of its own citizens, requiring nation state ‘B’ and/or the
international community to recognize that intervention is essential. However,
analysis of when intervention is deemed essential and criteria justifying inter-
vention suggest an enormous lack of clarity and lack of objective standards and
benchmarks.” Amos N. Guiora, Intervention in Libya, Yes; Intervention in
Syria, No: Deciphering the Obama Administration, 44 CASEW. RES. J. INT’L L.
251, 272 (2011) (citation omitted). Because of such lack of objective standards
and clarity on the subject of humanitarian intervention, the development of an
appropriate normative framework, such as the one proposed by Koh, would be
a beneficial and much-needed development in international law because the
existence of a firm framework could prevent misuse of the humanitarian inter-
vention rationale for the use of force. In other words, states would no longer be
able to use the rationale, for which there are currently no firm rules, to justify
any use of force; instead, states would be obliged to demonstrate in each in-
stance where force is used for an allegedly humanitarian purpose how such use
of force corresponds to the normative framework on humanitarian interven-
tion.
205 U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council.”).
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Security Council may be paralyzed, it would nonetheless be pos-
sible for the intervenor state to seek allies. The United States
attempted to do so when it first considered the possibility of us-
ing force against Syria—President Obama sought British and
French assistance.206 The Bush administration’s response to the
9/11 terrorist attacks also centered on building an international
coalition of states willing to combat terrorism.207 And the Ko-
sovo air strikes, conducted with a humanitarian goal, were led
by a NATO coalition of states.208 The existence of an interna-
tional alliance, in most instances, demonstrates that multiple
states are concerned with a given situation, that the humanitar-
ian intervention is not “unilateral,” and that multiple states con-
sider that the use of force is appropriate. The requirement that
states build or attempt to build an international coalition any
time they wish to engage in humanitarian intervention could
prevent individual states from staging military actions with
nonhumanitarian goals under the pretext of humanitarian in-
tervention.
Third, Koh himself has eloquently responded to the criticism
by Professor Kaye regarding Koh’s allegedly wrong interpreta-
tion of Article 2(4) and the Kosovo “precedent” for humanitarian
intervention. As mentioned above, Professor Kaye believes that
international law as elaborated in the United Nations Charter
contains a per se prohibition on the use of force except for Secu-
rity Council approval and self-defense.209 Additionally, Profes-
sor Kaye has argued that Kosovo cannot be used as a precedent
because of the State Department’s refusal to acknowledge the
legality of this military intervention. 210 Koh’s response bril-
liantly summarizes the appeal and necessity of his proposed ap-
proach.
206 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
207 SARAH ANDERSON, PHYLLIS BENNIS & JOHN CAVANAGH, COALITION OF THE
WILLING OR COALITION OF THE COERCED?: HOW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
INFLUENCES ALLIES IN ITS WAR ON IRAQ (Feb. 26, 2003), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20030405184556/http://www.ips-
dc.org/COERCED.pdf (describing the building of the “Coalition of the Willing”
by the Bush Administration in the wake of 9/11).
208 See, e.g., STERIO, supra note 47, at 116 (discussing the NATO air strikes
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia aimed at protecting Kosovar Alba-
nians).
209 See Kaye, supra note 193.
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But why should the per se rule “remain the law,” particularly
if it is so manifestly outmoded, and tolerant of gross human
rights abuse? Whether or not Clinton’s lawyers were correct
fourteen years ago not to follow the UK and state a legal ra-
tionale justifying Kosovo, why is such silence warranted now?
. . . . But let’s also not make it easier for people of good will to
do nothing by pretending that the law is so determinate and
immutable in the face of compelling moral imperatives, that we
must keep treating as illegal what may now be necessary to
save lives or spur diplomacy to remove chemical weapons.211
As argued above, this Article believes that Koh is wrong in ar-
guing that humanitarian intervention has crystallized into a
new norm of international law as of today, and it thus takes the
stance that Professor Kaye is correct in his assessment of Article
2(4) and the per se illegality rule. However, this Article agrees
with Koh that a rule should not remain the law if it no longer
corresponds to our world’s reality and the needs of various peo-
ples around the planet. International law has never been stag-
nant, and it has evolved and changed drastically over the past
century. Today, we may need it to evolve in a particular direction
and to embrace the concept of humanitarian intervention under
a newly developed normative framework. However, if in the fu-
ture humanitarian intervention becomes an unnecessary, ill-
used, cumbersome norm, international law players can act to
change the norm. If rogue states misuse the norm and engage in
reprehensible military actions under the pretense of humanitar-
ian assistance, the international community can re-evaluate and
re-interpret the norm or can pass treaty provisions to overturn
the norm. International law has evolved because of changes in
our society and the need to preserve international peace and se-
curity in a different manner. Similarly, international law can
change in the future to respond to distinct future needs of our
global community.
C. The Proposal Reconstructed
In light of the above discussion, this Article proposes that hu-
manitarian intervention should be legal under the following
framework:
211 Koh, Part III, supra note 1.
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if there is an ongoing humanitarian crisis of a significant pro-
portion;
the Security Council is deadlocked because of persistent veto
or threat of veto by one or more permanent members;
the intervening nation has exhausted all other nonmilitary
remedies;
the intervening nation attempts to build an international or
regional coalition of states willing to participate in the human-
itarian military intervention;
the intervening nation reports, on an ongoing basis, to the Se-
curity Council and any other relevant organs of the United Na-
tions about all stages of its military intervention; and
the intervening nation stages its humanitarian military action
in a manner proportionate to the ongoing crisis, as well as nec-
essary to the halting of such crisis.
The above-proposed framework is similar to Koh’s in many re-
spects. Like Koh, this Article believes that humanitarian inter-
vention should only be justified in situations of serious magni-
tude, where the Security Council has been paralyzed and where
the intervening nation has exhausted all other diplomatic, polit-
ical, and economic options. Like Koh, this Article believes that
any humanitarian intervention needs to be necessary and pro-
portionate in scope to the crisis which it is attempting to resolve.
However, this Article disagrees with Koh that the intervening
nation should be threatened by the actions of the state or regime
having caused the humanitarian crisis because this requirement
creates too strong of a rapprochement between self-defense and
humanitarian intervention. The purpose of humanitarian inter-
vention by any intervening nation should be military assistance
in situations where the Security Council is unavailable and
where the self-defense paradigm is inapplicable. Thus, the
framework proposed herein eliminates the requirement that the
intervening nation’s security be somehow threatened or compro-
mised by the ongoing crisis.
Moreover, this Article takes the view that legitimizing human-
itarian intervention involves bringing it as close as possible to
an international, United Nations-approved action. When a na-
tion stages a unilateral military action, without any kind of in-
ternational consultation or assistance, such military action has
the potential to appear self-interested, although its motives may
2014] HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 167
be purely altruistic, such as helping a foreign civilian popula-
tion. If a nation, on the contrary, attempts to build a regional or
international coalition, this in turn may demonstrate a common
humanitarian interest among several nations in assisting a
troubled people. A regionally or internationally led humanitar-
ian intervention may satisfy the international community more
easily about its motivation and goals. Similarly, if a nation is
required to report its military actions to the Security Council or
other appropriate organs of the United Nations, it will face po-
litical pressure to justify such action under existing interna-
tional law, and it may therefore be dissuaded from engaging in
faux humanitarian interventions, which may resemble aggres-
sion or another type of illegal use of force.
Thus, the proposal in this Article adds two requirements: the
attempt to build a multilateral coalition by the intervening na-
tion and the necessity to report back to the Security Council or
other United Nations’ organs about the ongoing military inter-
vention. Finally, this Article disagrees with Koh that a carefully
constructed humanitarian intervention under any proposed
framework would not violate Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter under existing international law. Thus, the proposal
here eliminates this statement and is silent on this issue. In-
stead, this Article believes that if lawyers are sufficiently per-
suasive in presenting arguments that seek to develop a norma-
tive framework on humanitarian intervention, such arguments
and proposals, it will lead toward the establishment of a new
norm of international law legalizing humanitarian intervention
in the near future.
This Article considers that it is the lawyers’ duty to construct
an appropriate normative framework for the legality of human-
itarian intervention, which could some day be morphed into a
binding norm through treaty or customary law. If a considerable
number of states support legalizing humanitarian intervention,
the hope is that these states would negotiate a multilateral
treaty on this issue that would adopt the above-proposed frame-
work or a variation thereto. In the absence of a treaty, it is also
possible that the proposed framework could evolve into a binding
norm of customary law. As mentioned above, a lawyer seeking
to prove the existence of a customary norm, such as humanitar-
ian intervention, would need to demonstrate the existence of
state practice as well as opinio juris. Some state practice on hu-
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manitarian intervention already exists, and if more states en-
gage in this type of action in the future in a consistent and uni-
form manner, it may be possible to observe the emergence of
state practice sufficient to support the existence of humanitarian
intervention as a norm of customary law. If states engaged in
the practice of humanitarian intervention couple their military
actions with legal rationale—if they adopt a legal framework,
such as the one proposed above, to justify their actions on a con-
sistent legal basis, it may be possible to witness the emergence
of opinio juris on this subject as well. It is my hope that, in the
near future, scholarship such as this Article will have contrib-
uted toward the creation of a new norm of international law—
humanitarian intervention, under carefully prescribed circum-
stances, leaving little room for abuse and much potential for im-
proving tragic situations across our planet.
VI. APPLYING THEHUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION FRAMEWORK
TO SYRIA
Could humanitarian intervention in Syria today satisfy the
above-proposed framework for legality? Was President Obama
correct in his somewhat precipitous conclusion that the unilat-
eral use of force in Syria could be legally justified in light of Pres-
ident Assad’s use of chemical weapons, the ongoing humanitar-
ian crisis, the refugee situation that has been unsettling regional
stability, and the Security Council’s paralysis due to the veto
threatened by Russia and China over any use-of-force-authoriz-
ing resolution?
The Syrian crisis has turned into a humanitarian catastrophe
of a significant proportion, involving a massive flow of refugees
as well as the use of dangerous weapons, threatening to destabi-
lize the region. The Security Council has been involved, but re-
mains deadlocked over the issue of the use of force. Thus, the
first two requirements of the above framework appear satisfied.
However, as of today, not all other nonmilitary remedies have
been exhausted as the international community, through the Se-
curity Council, is still heavily involved in Syria, attempting to
reach a nonmilitary solution. The Security Council recently
passed a resolution calling for a United Nations-led inspection
and destruction regime over Syrian chemical weapons.212 The
third requirement of the proposed regime (that the intervening
212 See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
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nation exhaust all nonmilitary options) is therefore not satisfied
as of now. Should matters change and should Syria choose to
disrespect the inspection regime, then a country like the United
States could start building a solid legal case for humanitarian
intervention under the proposed framework.
In addition, if the Assad regime were to violate the newly-im-
posed chemical weapons inspection and destruction regime, a
potential intervenor nation, such as the United States, would
have the burden of constructing the most adequate military re-
sponse, which would be limited to resolving the humanitarian
situation, necessary and proportionate vis-à-vis the Assad re-
gime and which would end when the situation is resolved. In or-
der to enhance legitimacy of this type of action, the intervenor
nation would have to work with its allies to build an interna-
tional coalition and report its actions to the Security Council and
the General Assembly. Under this framework, the risk for abuse
would be minimized while the necessary humanitarian response
would remain justified. If a country, like the United States, en-
gaged in this type of humanitarian intervention today, it would
violate Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. As argued
above, this Article disagrees with Koh on this point because his
proposal argues that humanitarian intervention under carefully
constructed circumstances would not violate international law.
However, this Article believes that it is important for both state
leaders and scholars to make this type of argument because new
norms of international law can only emerge through persistent
state action and the advancement of novel legal arguments. Be-
cause humanitarian intervention is a necessity in today’s world
of civil strife and violent internal conflicts, its legal framework
needs to be developed and constructed through clever legal com-
mentary and opinion.
CONCLUSION
Syria has the potential to constitute both a law-breaking
as well as a law-making moment. Because of the ongoing hu-
manitarian crisis in this volatile nation, countries that have con-
templated the possibility of staging a humanitarian interven-
tion, like the United States, could break the existing interna-
tional law prohibition on the use of force outside of the two es-
tablished exceptions, namely, Security Council approval and
self-defense. More importantly, however, Syria could turn into a
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law-making moment through the development of a new norma-
tive framework for humanitarian intervention, such as the one
proposed by Harold Koh.
Everyone who has worked in government knows that arguing
for an evolution in the law is a decision with which both policy-
makers and government lawyers must grapple. Asking policy-
makers to make a false choice between action and legality
sends them the false message that when the law gets hard, or
stands in the way of urgent action, lawyers are incapable of
developing sound legal arguments that can achieve better re-
sults or better map current law onto modern reality. In my
view, it is not our lawyerly responsibility simply to repeat that
‘a rule is a rule is a rule,’ particularly when the so-called ‘rule’
is not nearly as black and white as some may admit. While Syr-
ian diplomacy unfolds, this is a moment not to consider this
matter closed, but to look harder for a better legal answer.213
I wholeheartedly agree.
213 Koh, Part III, supra note 1.
